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1. Introduction  
 
This master thesis is based on the topics and knowledge acquired through our 
participation in the Master of Science in International Management program at 
BI. In the two-year program we have studied internationalization processes, firm 
specific critical capabilities, preconditions for foreign activities and external 
factors related to international establishments and operations. This thesis has been 
a great challenge where we have included topics from a variety of subjects and 
prior cases. 
 
 The internationalization of a firm is far from a straight-forward process. 
Conditions and variables are interconnected and related to numerous 
contingencies. The objective of this thesis is to explain the internationalization 
process of small high tech companies within the subsea oil and gas business in the 
region of Bergen, in the west-coast of Norway. This thesis is related to a research 
project financed by the Norwegian Research Council, the NCE Subsea cluster- 
Hordaland, and the NCE Maritime at Møre1. The project “A local cluster going 
international: balancing local and none-local networking?”  is led by associate 
professor Inger Beate Pettersen. The research focuses on cluster 
internationalization with a focus on small high- tech companies’ 
internationalization process. We were allowed to align the focus to what was 
beneficial for our formal thesis requirements. By this, the focus of the research 
was to investigate Norwegian small and medium sized (SMEs) firms that establish 
operations in Houston. Some of the firms were rather young when they started 
their internationalization process. Also most firms did not have prior international 
experience before the establishment in Houston. The managers’ perception of 
their firm’s motive, strategy and objective are thoroughly examined in this 
research.  
 
Clearly, all related decisions and variables from internationalization are not 
possible to include in one thesis. The research is therefore narrowed into the 
firms’ specific decisions and perceptions from the pre-entry process and the 
strategy making process of market entry. More, the thesis includes external 
                                                 
1 The Maritime cluster is included in the same overall research project, yet not a part of this thesis.  
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market, culture and industry factors that influence the firm and its decisions. 
These factors may represent barriers for the firm as they differ from the home 
country and therefore may be challenging to understand and react upon. 
Technology and industry culture barriers are given special attention. Discussions 
of the strategic choices of subsidiary staffing with regards to expats or locals are 
carefully examined. The management choice of establishment modes and the 
related experiences was also important to the research. More, the literature 
emphasizes the importance of networks in internationalization. Therefore an 
objective was to investigate how the Norwegian firms relate to network building 
and if they hold networks of important value. The research is based on a vast 
existing literature. As the firms in this research are fairly small and high-tech 
companies, literature and previous research related to the internationalization path 
for these are given special attention. The literature is used to describe the situation 
valid for these firms.  
 
The research is based on interviews with a total of 17 managers from various 
firms. Additionally 8 more interviews were performed with representatives from 
larger companies and two facilitators in Houston to give a more general 
perception on various topics in the research. The interviews were performed in 
Bergen and during a two-week fieldwork in Houston, U.S. As the thesis only 
discusses internationalization toward Houston, it was of great value to visit the 
subsidiaries and meet the subsidiary managers in person. This experience gave us 
a better understanding of the industry specifics of Houston and how they differed 
from Norway. We have summarized our most important findings in the paragraph 
of the conclusion and discussion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GRA 19003 – Master Thesis     01.09.2012  
Page 5 
1.1  Acknowledgements 
 
In addition to being the research project manager, Inger Beate Pettersen has also 
been our mentor throughout the project. She has provided us with valuable 
knowledge, shared her experiences with us and has been a great instructor. In the 
activities of interviews, analysis and problem definition, she has been highly 
involved and shown great interest for the project and our progress. We are most 
grateful for the valuable advices and support we received during this period. 
 
We would like to thank all the managers and key informants that voluntary 
participated in this research. The managers had a high workload, yet prioritized to 
meet with us. A special thanks to the managers we met with in Houston, which 
invited us to dinner, gave us contacts to other firms and spent much more time 
with us than what we asked for. Also Innovation Norway gave our project 
valuable attention, in which they gave us access to a wider population in Houston 
and replied with valuable feedback on our interview guide. They allowed us to use 
their offices in Houston and were pleased to help us with information and 
practical issues. It was a great pleasure to experience the support from the people 
at Innovation Norway. We are both impressed and truly grateful for the 
experience all facilitators and managers facilitated to us! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GRA 19003 – Master Thesis     01.09.2012  
Page 6 
 
2. Literature review 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
The literature distinguishes the internationalization process regarding to whether 
the firm is a sm all or a larger organization, hence small and medium sized 
enterprise (SME) or multinational enterprise (MNE). The SME is defined as a 
firm with 500 or fewer em ployees (Cavusgil, 2008). Certainly, this is an 
American perspective, where companies in general are larger than in Norway. The 
population of this research is high tech co mpanies in the region of Bergen. In this 
cluster, most large company holds a fe w hundred employees. The SMEs of this 
research typically hold som e 10-80 em ployees. However, the co mpetitive 
advantages of an SME are typically their innovative an d adaptive capabilities 
(Cavusgil, 2008). They often target m arket niches that MNE‘s perceive too small 
to focus on. Mostly they adapt their pr oducts and marketing to special custom er 
needs. SMEs are usually more flexible and faster to respond to local m arket needs 
than MNEs (Cavusgil, 2008). On the ot her hand, they are often constrained by 
limited resources that prevent them from international expansion (Bilkey & Tesar, 
1977). That is why they leverage the serv ice and the expertise of interm ediaries 
and facilitators to succeed abroad (Chetty & Campbell, 2003).  
 
In this res earch the in ternationalization process will be based upon two m ain 
theoretical perspectives. The stage model2 of Johanson and Valhne (1977) 
emphasizes the need for gradual learning, learning by doing and the integration of 
knowledge. The Swedish rese archers developed the th eory throughout the 1970s. 
We also use the theory of born globals (e.g. Freeman, Edwards, & Schroder, 2006, 
Freeman, Edwards, & Schroder, 2006, Rennie, 1993) to explain SMEs 
internationalization. The theory deve loped throughout the 1990s and is still 
growing as a research field. Researcher s as Knight and Cavusgil (2004) explain 
the internationalization process f or firms that internationalize with f airly few 
resources and minor previous international experience. This theory contributed to 
revise explanatory f actors related to stag e models of internationalization 
                                                 
2 Also referred to as Uppsala Model 
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(Gabrielsson, Kirpalani, Dim itratos, Solberg, & Zuccella, 2008) and therefore 
reasonable to include in this chapter. 
 
2.2  The stage model 
 
The Uppsala m odel explains the interna tionalization process of fir ms from the 
perspective of infor mation and knowle dge acquisition - and integration. The  
researchers Johanson and Valhne (1977) based their m odel on fir ms` need for 
gradual acquisition and integration of know ledge of foreign markets and how this 
knowledge facilitated their fo reign operations. In the in ternationalization process 
of SMEs, they face great challeng es due to lack of foreign m arket knowledge. 
This situation leads to high uncertainty and therefore also as an obstacle to the 
firms international progression. T he use of incremental learning m eans that 
previous foreign operations will giv e the firm  access to the m arket knowledge 
needed (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). That is why the m odel emphasizes the need 
for the internationalization process to begin in close m arkets that holds m ore 
similarities to the market of the firms’ origin. The market distance is referred to as 
psychic distance. This is used as a concept to explain the barriers of a foreign 
market. Johanson and Vahlne (1977)  defined the psychic distance as “sum of the 
factors preventing the flow from and to the market”. Examples of factors related 
to psychic distance are differences in language, education, business practices, 
culture and industrial development. In oth er words, the firm s will start 
internationalizing in geographically clos e countries through increm ental learning 
and then start to internationalize into markets further away. Increm ental learning 
is defined as gradually learning thr ough “learning by doing”, where you enter 
similar countries and then use the acquire d knowledge to move to m ore distant 
markets (Johanson & Vahlne 1977).   
 
The underlying presumption of the model is that firms select entry m odes in the 
early phase of internationalization that usually are associated with a lower risk. A 
firm is assumed to acquire knowledge through this own foreign experiences and 
also increase its comm itment to th e foreign market as th e internationalization 
process evolves. The lack of knowle dge is a great barrier for the developm ent of 
the firm’s foreign operations. As the m arket knowledge and experience increases, 
firms usually advances to operation modes with m ore risk. The Swedish 
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researchers argue that with rega rd to the choice of entry modes and the choice of 
foreign market, the firms follow a succes sive establishment of international 
operations. Also, the choice of m arkets and the choice of entry m odes seem to be 
based upon the psychological distance betw een the foreign m arket and the hom e 
market (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). By this, the fir m tends to select m arkets that 
have a high degree of cultural proxim ity and geographical closeness in the early 
internationalization. The firm will en ter more distant m arkets when the 
commitment toward the  present international operations, the experience and the 
knowledge evolves.  
 
2.2.1  Culture and internationalization  
 
The culture and the concepts of  psychic distance may be challenging to 
comprehend. With less prior knowledge of foreign culture and its implications, 
managers are endangered to base decisions without being able to process the 
consequences cultural differences may bring. By failing to comprehend with these 
differences, the business plan and the inte rnational establishment would be base d 
on wrong inputs which, probably, in turn results in an underestim ate of the  
challenges ahead (Ghem awat, 2001). Cultu ral differences and the impacts are 
investigated in the liter ature to an al most unlimited extent. A great num ber of 
researchers have in years m ade great efforts to grasp the co ncept of culture an d 
developed conceptual models for m anagerial purposes. Ghe mawat (2001) 
developed the Cage framework which is m ent as a managerial tool for m anagers 
to access the impact of distance in the various industries.  By this framework, four 
dimensions are included; cultural, ad ministrative, geographic and econom ic 
distance. By these dim ensions the aut hor argues that the tool would assist 
managers in understanding the distance to f oreign markets and the related 
implications. This framework is only a sm all contribution of the theory related to 
cultural challenges.  
 
Gert Hofstede perform ed a six years study within IBM which resulted in the 
publishing of Cultures Consequences by 1980. This research have had great 
inplications for the research of cultu re as it introduced five explanatory 
dimensions of culture. The general idea was that culture should not be defined, yet 
rather measured to each other. M eaning that Hofstede designed dim ensions to 
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make different cultures comparable to each other. In that way managers would see 
how cultures differed. In this way m anagers are able to understand the differences 
of foreign cultures compared to its native cu lture. There exists a great num ber of 
definitions of culture, yet the def inition applied in the work of  Hofstede is a s 
follows: “Culture consists in patterned ways of thinking, feeling and reacting, 
aquired and transmitted mainly by symbols, constituting the distinctive 
achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the 
essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and 
selected) ideas and especially their attached values.  (Hofstede, 2001: 119) This 
definition was used a s a base to d evelop the five dimensions.  All dim ensions 
provide a score from  0 to 100 to explain all the variables in all the countries 
included in the research. Although the country scores were  originally produced in 
the early 1970s, Hofstede`s cultural dimensions have been replicated in numerous 
studies and  have proved that country ranking from the initial data-set is still valid  
(Marieke & Hofstede, 2010).  
 
The first dimension, power distance, refers to the extent to which less powerf ul 
members of a society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally   
(Marieke & Hofstede, 2010). The next dim ension individualism versus 
collectivism refers to the extent to which persons are focusing on their own and 
their family`s needs, or wether they focus on the needs of the larger “we”. In a 
typical individualistic culture people will act as if their personal values are valid 
for the entire world  (Marieke & Hofstede, 2010). The dim ension masculinity 
versus feminity refers to if people focuses on achievem ents and succes 
(Masculinity) or if the quality of life is more important (F emininity). The next 
dimension , uncertainty a voidance, is related to “the extent to which people feel 
threatened by uncertainty and ambiguity and try to avoid these situations” 
(Marieke & Hofstede, 2010). The score of this dim ension will define to which  
degree one need rules, for mality and structure to life. The final dim ension, long 
versus short-term orientation is related to wether the society holds strong beliefs 
in traditions and stability (short-te rm) or if  the society c ares for status-based 
relationship, investment for the future and the way we are perceived.  
 
Every country has its score on all of these dimensions. By comparing different 
countries, one get an impression of what cultural aspect that differs and how 
GRA 19003 – Master Thesis     01.09.2012  
Page 10 
foreign cultures fluctuates towards the managers own culture home3. This tool is 
argued to be an efficient method in comprehending the psychic distance and the 
differences between the various nationalities and cultural aspects. However, 
researchers emphasizes that such dimensions never will be able to distinguish the 
regional differences whitin a nationality, or the disparity of the various citizens of 
a country. As presented in the following graph, Norway and US has some 
differences on the various dimensions. The following information is sourced in 
the webpage, referred to under the modell.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model: Country Culture, Geert Hofstede 
http://geert-hofstede.com/norway.html 
 
 
From the source one can find that the differences are at the most for the 
dimensions individualism and masculinity. Americans would care highly for 
themselves and have less of “we”. They would not be shy about approaching 
strangers. In Norway the “self” is also important, yet there are more clear lines 
between business and private life. The diffferences in this dimension is not as 
great as in the masculinity; In this dimension the U.S scores 62 which describes  a 
masculine society were “the winner takes it all”. Monetary rewards, promotions 
and success will lead to higher status. This is important for americans who “live to 
work”.  On the contrary, Norway scores 8 and is referred to as the second most 
feminine society, after Sweden. To be better than others is not rewarded. Caring 
                                                 
3 The application of Hofstede`s research are available at the world wide web. Managers may plot 
the country of interest and get the comparison by the nations of interest.  
At http://geert-hofstede.com/norway.html one could check the difference between Norway and the 
U.S.  
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for soft values and the environment is important. More, “work to live” with 
incentives such as free time and flexibility is favored. Clearly this is in great 
contradiction to the U.S culture. Still, national culture will not include regional 
variances and specific organizational cultures. Never the less, the findigs of 
Hofstede illustrate the significant differences between the Norwegian and the U.S 
culture.  
 
 
2.2.2 Managers’ perceptions of own market knowledge 
 
Scholars emphasize that entrant firms lack knowledge about the foreign market, 
and that the knowledge only can be acquired by incremental learning (Bilkey & 
Tesar, 1977; Cavusgil, 1984; Forsgren & Johanson, 1992; Johanson and Vahlne 
1977; Johanson & Wiedersheim, 1975). Yet, managers tend to overestimate their 
perceived familiarity with local markets when entering a new market (Pedersen & 
Pedersen, 2004). Pedersen and Petersen (2004) reveal that managers rely too 
much on the information they get through networks, and that managers 
overestimate their knowledge of foreign markets before entering. In other words 
managers tend to believe to have a certain level knowledge about the foreign 
market previous to establishment. However, after establishment the managers 
realize that the perceived level of knowledge was insufficient. Managers 
recognize a lack of knowledge and experience a shock effect during the first years 
of market entry, (the first 8 eight years in the specific study).  In other words; the 
manager will acknowledge the lack of local market knowledge only after 
establishment. In the specific study (Pedersen & Pedersen, 2004), firms gained the 
market-knowledge which they thought they had in the beginning, first after 14 
years of experience in one specific market. In the study, the shock effect was valid 
for tacit knowledge. The effect was at the largest in close distant markets and 
lower in high distant markets (Pedersen and Pedersen 2004).  
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2.2.3  Recent internationalization studies  
 
Previous internationalization literature have focused primarily on firms gaining 
knowledge from the home market and then expanded internationally through 
incremental learning (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, Johanson &Vahlne, 1990). Firms 
challenging the traditional internationalization literature have since the `90ties 
increased.  Forsgreen (2002) argues in his article that the concept of learning in 
the Uppsala Model is too narrow, which in turn limits the models ability to 
explain and predict the internationalization behavior precisely. Research has 
shown that it is possible to have a successful internationalization strategy based on 
skills and resources of other organizations (Hara & Kanai, 1994, Coviello & 
Munro, 1997). 
 
Forsgreen (2002) argues in his review of the Uppsala model of 
internationalization that learning can be acquired through other means than only 
through learning by doing. The concept of experiential learning is resource and 
time demanding and requires competence, which may be missing in a firm in the 
beginning of the internationalization process. Three types of learning get 
attention; learning through imitation, acquisition and proactive market research 
(Forsgreen 2002). The first opportunity is to imitate other companies, where the 
firms still have a level of uncertainty and decide to follow or copy the actions of 
other firms. Another opportunity is to increase the speed in the 
internationalization process by acquiring local companies or personnel that 
already possess the necessary market knowledge. This point is the opposite of the 
Uppsala model that emphasizes the importance of incremental learning. The third 
option is market research through networks, alliances or surveys. This market 
research could provide the firm with general information, which also could be 
useful to get insight in the market (Forsgreen 2002).  
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2.2.4  Internationalization in the oil industry  
 
The process of internationalization and the access to knowledge may differ across 
industries. The firms’ internationalization process may be affected by industry 
specifics and the geographical locations of the business. The firms in this research 
operate in the oil industry, which holds some specific characteristics. The 
activities in this global industry are limited to some specific locations, and the 
industry has a high degree of interconnections. These traits, amongst other, may 
limit firms to not have the option of “…comfortably choosing to initially enter 
markets with the least psychological/cultural differences (markets implying low 
risk) or that are most appropriate in terms of the internal resources of the firm” 
(Solberg & Akesland, 2006) The geographical distribution of the world’s oil 
regions may therefore affect the firms’ expansion pattern in the 
internationalization process and its target markets. The firms are therefore 
expected to choose a geographical pattern of internationalization that differs 
somewhat from the stage model, where firms can begin in markets of low psychic 
distance in the early phase of internationalization (e.g. in neighboring countries). 
Norwegian firms in the oil industry will typically first expand to Aberdeen – 
which is culturally close, and then they will go on to other international hubs for 
the global oil and gas industry: Houston, Singapore, Rio de Janeiro and Angola, 
hence gradually choose markets with higher psychic distance. To operate in a 
global industry with limited locations and markets that are culturally close, may 
therefore represent a challenge for Norwegian firms from the oil and gas industry.  
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2.3  The born global theory  
 
“There seems to be a need for models that can capture the early phase of 
internationalization better than the received models” (Johanson & Vahlne,  
2003).  
 
This observation has been emphasized due to the global competition and 
accelerating technological development which force firms to internationalize more 
rapidly than some decades ago. Johanson and Vahlne (2003) put forward the 
argument that the concept of “learning by doing” cannot be replaced by market 
information and surveys. While other researchers argue that firms are able to 
overcome the psychic distance by gaining direct experiential knowledge of 
foreign markets (Arenius, 2005, Coviello & Munro, 1997) In other words, 
researchers emphasize the need for a model that captures a broader perspective of 
the internationalization process.   
 
A born global firm refers to a: “business organizations that, from or near their 
founding, seek superior international business performance from the application 
of knowledge-based resources to the sale of outputs in multiple countries” 
(Knight & Cavusgil , 2004: 124) Born globals typically demonstrate accelerated 
internationalization, referring to both precocity and speed  (Gabrielsson et. al, 
2008) With limited resources and lack of knowledge, these firms internationalized 
rapidly from inception. The liberalization of the economy and the increased 
globalization should be considered as the driver for the emergence of born global 
firms (Tamar, 2004). The phenomenon of born globals cannot be explained by the 
Uppsala model and indicates a clear gap within the previous fields of research.  
 
In 1993, McKinsey defined these types of firms as born globals, working with an 
Australian study. These firms exported, on average, only two years after their 
foundation and achieved 76 percent of their total sales through exports (Rennie, 
1993). These firms did not follow the traditional internationalizing strategies, 
where the primary focus of their activities remained at the home market, but rather 
started to internationalize from inception. This study’s definition excludes firms 
that started to export later than two years. Yet, the same firms may experience the 
same internationalization process as a born global. Hence the definition by 
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Gabrielsen et al. (2008) should be considered more appropriate as the latter define 
a born global firm as one having products with global market potential. The firm 
can combine this potential with an entrepreneurial capability to seek methods of 
accelerated internationalization. This definition is relevant as it grasps the concept 
of born global precisely, without being highly technical as e.g. McKinsey’s 
proposed definition.   
 
There exist a num ber of explanatory fa ctors to the born globals pattern of  
international expansion. The globalization of markets with its hom ogenization of 
demands and the increasing opportunities fo r niche m arkets is one of  the m ost 
overlying reasons. Also are the continuous ly advances of technology both within 
production, communication and logistics. L ikewise, it has been argued that the 
importance of global networks and  alliances have enabled  SMEs to reach f or 
competitive advantages. This is explained by Solberg and Askeland (2006). They 
found the global oil industry to be ch aracterized by a high degree of  
homogenization across markets. Therefore the industry holds a competition with a 
high degree of interconnectedness. By this, one could expect that technologies and 
competence developed in one region would be applied in regi ons anywhere else. 
Yet, one should expect som e geological, environmental, political and socio-
cultural factors to have  some implications for the varia tions in dem ands. Also, 
specific local industry culture, purchasing st rategies, institutional traits and socio-
economic factors m ay affect the transfer of supply (technology) (S olberg & 
Akesland, 2006) 
 
2.3.1  High tech SMEs and internationalization  
 
In a study of the internationalization pro cess of high tech SMEs, Schulz et. al 
(2009) found some important explanatory factors. Firstly, Schulz found that the 
application of technology often wa s a driv er for international expansion in the 
young SME. These firms often competed on qualities created through innovation, 
typically within industries defined as knowledge-intensive. The strategic 
positioning was toward global n iche markets, where the SM E could leverage its 
small size through core capabilities of  specialization and dynam ic technology 
focus (Schulz, Borghoff, & Kraus, 2009). The opportunity to exploit technology 
and competence internationally w as one of the underlying m otivations for 
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international expansion. Mostly technology developm ent and R&D were  
performed in the home market and then exported. However, som e SMEs face the 
need of international establishment to certain markets in order to f inance or 
accommodate larger R&D projects. Va rious foreign m arkets often hold 
differentiated specific know-how and demands within the same industry (Etemad, 
2004). This situation is found to be an important reason for the necessity of 
internationalization for seve ral high-tech SMEs . Gabrielsson et al. (2008) also 
found that the SME should posess a uni que technology, hold a high degree of 
specialized competences and know -how and have superior design, product or 
services. However, it is also a necessity that the market perceive these qualities as 
substantial value adding for the industry  (Schulz,  Borghoff, & Kraus, 2009). A 
born global should also hold some organizational qualifications in order to enable 
their competitiveness. Solid m arket commitment, a proactive m anagement, 
flexibility, strong custom er orientation,  strong use of personal and business 
networks and a global m arket vision fr om inception- are all highlighted as 
important credentials (Rialp, Rialp , & Knight, 2005). 
 
 
2.4  SMEs and internationalization 
 
The study of SMEs internationalization process has reached increased 
consideration in the last decade (e.g. Knight et al. 2004; Zahra 2005; Rialp et al. 
2005; Schulz et al. 2009). Traditionally, multinational companies (MNEs) were 
seen more competitive in international markets, while SMEs suffered from 
restrains in resources such as human capital, finance, market knowledge and 
management experiences. These constraints are still perceived to create barriers 
for an SME in their process of internationalization. In the literature, researchers 
still study how decisions are made within SMEs and how the decision process of 
an SME is executed and what it is based upon.   
 
The typical limitations an SME face in the process of internationalization, as 
already presented is based on the limited managerial resources. This often results 
in less focus planning, analysis and strategy development. Lin and Chaney (2007) 
argue that the high risk and costs of international establishments may function as a 
great challenge for SMEs to overcome. The limitations of the SME may hinder 
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the firm to reveal present opportunities in foreign markets. Marketing and 
strategic objectives may require substantial resources and commitment to be 
realizable. Arenius (2005) found that high tech SMEs often based their market 
selection by industry trends, sectorial targeting or domestic client followership 
(reffered to as piggy backing). This may be grounded in the firms limitations 
toward strategy development and implimentation.   
 
 
2.5  The choice of market entry mode  
 
2.5.1  Introduction  
 
The selection process of a foreign market is defined as the time from considering 
internationalizing to actually selecting a foreign market. This includes the reason 
to internationalize and why selecting that specific market. The speed of market 
penetration is defined by Arenius (2005) as “the time needed from market entry 
until the generation of sales income from that market”. In the term of psychic 
distance, a move to a market far-out will require more time to penetrate the market 
than more close markets. Managers with international experience will decrease the 
time needed in market penetration and help the firm to overcome their lack of 
knowledge through their network (Arenius, 2005; Crick & Spence 2005). This is 
also confirmed by Crick and Spence (2005) as they emphasize that firm’s 
internationalization in an early phase need a recruitment of an executive with the 
required international experience. The need for previous managerial experiences 
in foreign establishments will be discussed more thoroughly in a later paragraph.  
 
 
2.5.2  The modes  
 
The foreign entry mode is often classified into a low- risk group and a high risk 
group (Burgel & Murray, 2000). Operation mode is the same as entry mode, yet 
the entry mode is limited toward the initial mode chosen when the establishment 
was performed. It is correct to refer to Operation Mode when the discussion is 
related to the foreign market mode, also after the early establishment phase is 
performed. Often firms may choose to change from one mode to another. It is not 
unusual that a firm may change its mode after some experience and when 
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knowledge is acquired.  By low risk, operation modes such as agents, contractual 
entry arrangements, franchise, and other intermediaries’ arrangement are included. 
High risk modes, referred to as investment operation modes, are usually based on 
wholly-owned subsidiaries, acquisitions, and joint ventures. This mode is 
previously referred to as foreign direct investment (FDI).  In-between these modes 
are client followership. The firm holds the investment risk, yet a close customer 
reduces the perceived risk in foreign market. Client followership (piggybacking), 
as an entry mode, is presented as a form of marketing collaboration where firms 
seek to achieve a goal by allying with partners that complement their strengths 
and weaknesses (Terpstra & Chwo-Ming , 1990). This mode consists of both a 
carrier and a rider, where the carrier markets the rider’s products (Terpstra & 
Chwo-Ming , 1990). The SME are in most cases the rider, while the larger MNE 
normally is perceived as the carrier. Client followership may reduce the risk of an 
SMEs internationalization process. A company’s choice of its entry mode is often 
the result of a complex decision process with numerous trade-offs among 
alternative entry modes. And each entry mode has its benefit/cost dimensions in 
terms of risk, commitment, learning and control. Typically, the choice of entry 
mode is based on different factors: such as the company’s products and 
technologies, the company’s resources and commitment, the target country market 
and environment, and home country conditions (Root, 1994) 
 
There are two main motives underlying the entry to a foreign market (Tseng 
2007). First, there is an asset-seeking motive where a firm seeks country specific 
advantages such as technological, market or natural resources. The second refers 
to firms’ motive to exploit specific advantages in a foreign market. These 
advantages can be either technological capabilities, marketing capabilities and 
firm size. These underlying motives are expected to affect the choice of entry 
mode. When the motive is asset seeking, firms should consider a joint venture 
with a local partner. This because local partners generally provide resources that 
otherwise would be costly or prohibited to reproduce or transfer outside of the 
firm that controls the resource (Tseng, 2007). For instance, firms can rapidly gain 
local market knowledge and business networks through a joint venture with a 
local partner. Especially local market knowledge is perceived to be gained rapidly 
in a joint venture with a local partner. Also, if the firm-specific assets are difficult 
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to redeploy overseas, then the joint venture should be considered as the most 
appropriate mode of operation.    
 Conversely, when firms possess unique know-how or unique technology not to 
be leaked to other partners, they should consider a wholly owned subsidiary. This 
is the most efficient mode to exploit competitive advantages without the risk of 
diluting their know-how.  
 
A different, resource based view of the firm considers the effect of the domestic 
environment. Due to limited resources, the entry mode decision should be 
perceived as a trade-off between focus in home market and foreign market 
(Rasheed, 2005). An equity mode of foreign operations, such as wholly owned 
subsidiary, would require substantial financial and human resources. By this, the 
transfer of resources and focus to the foreign market would decrease the emphasis 
of activities and development in the domestic market. Rasheed (2005) finds that 
the environmental factors and development from both home market and foreign 
market should be taken into consideration in the decision of the entry mode 
strategy. The results implies that SMEs can experience a higher market 
performance through exporting (non-equity mode) if the domestic industrial 
growth are to be high. Yet, in the later years, SMEs have in general increased their 
effort in exploiting international markets and the international opportunities, even 
with the typical constraints of competencies and resources  (Zhou, Wu, & Lou, 
2007 ) Some of the explanation may be found in the way firms today interconnect 
and access pools of knowledge.  
 
 
2.5.3  Entry mode decision of high‐tech SMEs 
 
A survey of UK high-tech companies revealed that the entry mode decision of 
young, resource-constrained firm is a trade-off between the resources available 
and the support requirements of the customers (Burgel & Murray, 2000). The 
firms often use direct export or intermediaries as their operational mode, as these 
are not resource intensive. One important factor in the choice of entry mode was 
found to be the level of customization required. In case of high customization, the 
firm often found intermediaries to be of less value. Product complexity and need 
for customer interaction could also affect the choice between direct and indirect 
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export. While direct export let the firm control their know-how and operations, 
they still suffer of being alone. With use of intermediaries or allying with a 
partner, the born global gain access to a well-established network and the 
experience of the partner.  
 
The survey of Burgel and Murray (2000) found the entry decision to be a function 
of firm-specific, product specific, and target country specific factors. With regards 
to target country, it is found that most born globals enter countries with high 
psychic distance. This entry decision is not in accordance with the Uppsala model, 
because it implies that other factors must be regarded as more important for the 
firm, than psychic distance. In fact, the survey found that strategic exploitation is 
of greater importance in the entry decision (Burgel & Murray, 2000). Further, the 
strategic exploitation and the country spesifics is found to be more important, in 
the entry mode decision, than psychic distance. In other words, the exploitation of 
the commercial value in the technological competency is of high importance to 
ensure their survival. These factors are of importance when revealing the reason 
why high-tech firms do not follow the Uppsala model.   
 
As aforementioned, SMEs suffer from constraints in management, knowledge, 
networks and other resources in their internationalization –and market entry 
process. While multinational enterprises benefit from an extensive internal and 
external international network. SMEs normally rely on local networks with 
limited access to international competence (Agndal, Chetty , & Wilson, 2008). 
Smaller firms may also suffer of low levels of trust internationally compared to 
multinationals with large resources and well-known brand names and reputation. 
Low levels of trust may create problems in forming joint ventures with local 
partners, being a valuable source for tacit knowledge of market opportunities 
(Ellis, 2000).  
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2.6  The network perspective in internationalization 
 
“The old models of incremental learning are no longer valid” - Johanson and 
Vahlne (2003).  
 
The Uppsala Model predicts that firms start to internationalize according to 
psychic distance (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990). Firms that do not follow the 
traditional path when internationalizing, illustrate a new trend.  The dynamic 
environment has forced companies to be more innovative, due to the increased 
competition to survive. Still, many firms successfully penetrate markets rapidly 
and manage to overcome the psychic distance. Arenius (2005), support that firms 
are able to overcome psychic distance by gaining direct experiential knowledge 
through their networks. Axelsson and Easton (1992) define a network as “sets of 
two or more connected exchange relationships”. While business networks are 
defined as sets of interconnected business relationships, in which each exchange 
relation is between firms conceptualized as collective actors (Anderson et al., 
1994; Johanson and Vahlne, 2003).  
 
A great variety of firms internationalize based on unpredicted opportunities that 
arises from their network. Firms are dependent on relationships that develop 
gradually through interaction between each other, which in turn will lead to higher 
commitment to the relationship (Johanson and Valhne 2003;  Anderson & Weitz, 
1992, Blankenburg et al. 1999). Internationalization is according to the process 
view a process of increasing commitments to foreign operations. The greater, the 
more specific, and the more integrated with other firm activities in those market 
are, the stronger is the firm’s dependence on them (Johanson and Valhne 2003). 
This is emphasized by Johanson and Valhne (2003) when they state that the 
earlier experience and commitments will influence where the first market entry 
will occur. The impact of relationship and commitment will be investigated to 
reveal their importance on Norwegian subsea companies decision processes.   
 
 
 
 
 
GRA 19003 – Master Thesis     01.09.2012  
Page 22 
 
2.6.1  The importance of networks in internationalization 
 
The use and im portance of networks, in the internationalization process of the 
SME has been highlighted by a great number of recent studies. These studies have 
pointed to the use of various networks to  enhance the competitive advantages of 
the firm and to overcom e the t ypical constraints of SMEs. Rialp (2005) 
emphasizes the importance of understanding the internationalization process of an 
SME to be able to understand the va lue of network theory approaches. 
Furthermore he argu es that thes e networks often are required prior to the 
internationalization process. These networks  will be an im portant channel for the 
firm to access valuable resources, experiences, knowledge and competences. As a 
direct result, the  firms’ international strategies, the capabilities, the market 
knowledge and risk perception will be a ffected by the transf er of knowledge 
through the network. Knight and Cavusgil (2004) found result that supported this 
observation and added the argum ent that access to networks would shorten the 
time required for learning and accelerate th e speed of search for m arket 
knowledge. Others also argued that the strategic capacity of  the S ME is an 
interaction between the  firms’ managerial resources and the network resources. 
Likewise, the resources in the network wi ll be a co re driver for the firm s’ 
competitive position in foreign markets (Schulz, Borghoff, & Kraus,  2009). The 
network should therefore be perceived as a social capital that enables growth and 
development for resource-constraint SM Es. Networks will provide a pool of 
contacts and also lead  to access to knowledge related to m arket know-how, 
distribution channels, financing, culture and more.  (Coviello, 2006) This is in 
compliance with Johanson and Valhne (1992) that found the network to work as a  
bridge into foreign m arkets, from the relationship with cust omers and suppliers 
for high tech firms.  
 
2.6.2  Network learning 
 
There are three types of business network learning (Johanson and Valhne 2003; 
Pahlberg, 2001). The first type of learning is partner specific, which is an outcome 
of interaction between firms. Where the firms learn about each other, such as how 
the partner adapts to different circumstances or the roles of different individuals. 
This type of learning will contribute to higher commitment to the relationship.  
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Furthermore, the second type of learning is when companies learn from a 
relationship that can be transferred to  and used in other relationships. Examples 
of this could be information on how to create new connections, and how to 
develop different relationship. The third type of learning is to know how to 
coordinate activities through interaction. This could concern e.g. supplier 
relationships, issues such as on time deliveries and activity specific know-how. 
Additionally a fourth type ascends, where firms learn to build new business 
networks and connect them to each other (Johanson and Valhne, 2003). Network 
and relationship creation is time and resource demanding, and therefore the 
internationalization will be based on the managers existing network. Johanson and 
Valhne (2003) confirms this when they state that the earlier experience and 
commitments will influence where the first market entry will occur. 
 
2.7  Access to and transfer of market knowledge 
 
A major concern in the internationalization process is the access to market 
knowledge. Market knowledge is usually divided into explicit and tacit. Explicit 
knowledge is regarded as demographic data, macroeconomic statistics and other 
identifiable market measures. Tacit knowledge on the other hand is the opposite of 
explicit knowledge. This knowledge is more hidden and more experientially-
based knowledge, useful to navigate the intricacies of different cultures, political 
regimes and socioeconomic systems (Eriksson, Johanson, Majkgard, & Sharma, 
1997). Explicit forms of market knowledge that do exist might be of questionable 
quality or might be expired due to political or economic changes. The acquisition 
of the explicit market knowledge can therefore evolve into a lengthy and difficult 
process. However, tacit knowledge tends to be even more difficult to acquire 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 1977).  
 
Even though the acquisition of the various kinds of market knowledge is 
considerably difficult, another perspective of importance is the transfer of 
knowledge within the organization. Organizational learning about a new host 
country is not a smooth and seamless process. It appears to be a complex process 
that varies significantly among firms, due to variations in internal flows of local 
market knowledge (Lord & Ranft, 2000). Moreover, tacit knowledge seems to be 
acquired through personal experiences and therefore difficult to separate from 
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individuals who posses it  (Polanyi, 1962). To ensure transfer of tacit knowledge 
througout the organization, strong ties and involvment from the headquarter (HQ) 
may function as a safeguard to obtain the information flow. By this, the HQ can 
involve in subsidiary decisions and assist the strategy development. Without HQ 
involvement in the subsidiary strategy development, the transfer of knowledge 
would be limited and the tacit knowledge only to be hold by a few individuals.  
Another key ingredient of the organizational structure is the involvement of 
executive managers. A reward or incentive system can increase managers’ active 
engagement in divisional strategy formulation and implementation (Lord & Ranft, 
2000). Managers do often have accumulated host country knowledge through past 
experiences. A cross-unit incentive system will increase the probability that 
managers share their knowledge to other divisions (Lord & Ranft, 2000). Last, 
rotation of managers and the transfer to different locations could lead to more 
internal share of knowledge.    
 
In the perspective of management capabilities, the discussion is centralized toward 
a local manager or an expatriate. Hiring local managers is an effective method of 
acquiring both tacit and explicit local knowledge (Mitra & Golder, 2002). The 
necessary familiarity with the local market and business leads to a higher 
emphasis of hiring local managers. On the contrary, use of local managers will 
limit the management development and the organizational development (Harzing, 
2001). In other words, managers from the home country will not gain the 
necessarily international experience if local managers are employed at the sub. 
Further, the creation or improvement of communication channels between the HQ 
and sub will suffer of less verbal communication (Harzing, 2001). Scholars argue 
that use of local managers or home-country (expatriate) is a trade-off between 
acquisitions of local market knowledge and the development of the organization 
as a whole. These findings illustrate that organizational structure is decisive for 
the internal transfer of knowledge. The relationship between the sub and the HQ 
affects the level of knowledge transfer. Appropriate use of executive managers 
and subsidiary managers can facilitate a higher level of internal transfer of 
knowledge.  Use of local managers in subsidiaries should be perceived as an 
efficient method of acquiring both tacit and explicit local knowledge, while the 
organizational development would be limited without use of home-country 
managers.  
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2.7.1  Managerial competences in a subsidiary  
 
Previous international experiences by managers are emphasized by scholars as an 
issue with great implications in market penetration. Managers with experience can 
provide a company with networks, the necessary experience to contemplate 
among opportunities and the experience to decide upon future prospects.  Arenius 
(2005) stress the importance of a manager with international experience as they 
can “…take advantage of their international experience and target distant 
markets immediately”. The importance of managers or founders network is also 
emphasized by Lechner & Dowling, (2003) where they emphasizes managers 
network as the most important to overcome the liability of newness. In the 
internationalization processes, there are certain events that cannot be planned, and 
where it is more important to be able to adapt and act dynamically. The 
importance of the managers that has the experience and contacts from a network 
should not been underestimated (Crick & Spence, 2005) Furthermore, using 
existing network in the early phase of internationalization may decrease the 
psychic distance. Managerial resources with international experience can 
contribute to enable firms to prepare for international development and target 
growth markets (Crick and Spence 2005). In other words managers with 
international experience will be better able to identify and exploit overseas 
opportunities. These factors will facilitate the firm’s opportunity to recognize the 
dynamics of changing environmental conditions through their network (Crick and 
Spence 2005).  
 
2.7.2  Social Capital and management control  
 
SMEs in the early stage of the internationalization process often lack resources  
(Chetty & Campbell, 2003) They need to be innovative in the internationalization 
process and focus on their existing relationship with other firms to identify and 
exploit specific business opportunities (Agndal et al., 2008). Another way to 
internationalize when the resources are limited is to rely on founders and 
managerial experience. Research literature emphasizes the importance of 
experience in the management when internationalizing. Networks and social 
capital are especially important to small firms and startups because these firms 
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often suffer from the liability of newness (Han, 2006). At the same time Han 
(2006) argues that this is valid even if the SME is a born global or if it takes 
incremental steps toward internationalization (Stage Model). The social capital is 
stated to derive from individual persons or the organization as an entity. The 
social capital may be acquired from external sources or internal sources, as the 
transfer of knowledge is key.  
 
To narrow the discussion to the social capital to the individuals within the 
company, the individuals can contribute with experiences or knowledge that may 
be of great value to the organization. This experience could be international 
working experience, experience in living abroad and other international 
experience, which in turn will decrease the perceived psychic distance (Arenius, 
2005). This indicates that network, or so called Social Capital, is more important 
than what the traditional literature predicted. Social Capital is defined by Nahapiet 
& Goshal, (1998) as “the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded 
within, available through, and derived from the network of relationships 
possessed by an individual or social unit […] social capital comprises both the 
network and the assets that may mobilized through the network”. In other words, 
Social Capital is a firm’s network of relationship and the resources that can be 
acquired from the network, and consider both actual and potential network 
(Agndal, Chetty , & Wilson, 2008)  
 
2.7.3  External effects on knowledge transfer  
 
Gaur et al. (2007) emphasizes that the transfer of knowledge and information 
through relationships may be affected by the different environments that occurs 
between the home market and the host market. Gaur elaborates that these 
differences typically are based in culture, political and regulative inequalities. It is 
less use for a valuable transfer of information and knowledge through a 
connection, if the receiver is less capable of interpreting the information at hand. 
More, as business networks may function differently in the home market 
compared to the host market, thus lead to procedures in the network approach that 
decreases the perveived value of the network. Again, psychic distance serve as a 
useful indicator for the efficiency of the network connections. Particularly the 
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institutional4 differences  are stated to have significant impact of the succes of 
knowledge transfer within the network. The more similar the host market is in 
comparrison with the home market, the higher the value of the information 
received from the network. By this, the value of the knowledge transfer relies on 
the ability of communication between the sender and the receiver. A manager in 
the home market, the receiver, will depend in its ability to interpret the knowledge 
transfer from e.g. a subsidiary manager. Thus subsidiary staffing strategy is a 
principal strategic means for SMEs with international units to share knowledge, to 
coordinate activities, and to exercise control over their subsidiaries (Gaur et al 
2007). The choice of subsidiary staffing is then the key strategic issue. The 
management normally chooses between expatriates5 or locals6 to staff the 
subsidiary. The implications of this strategic choice affects the control and 
coordination role between headquarter and the subsidiary together with the 
configuration of the relationship (Gaur et al. 2007). 
 
2.7.4  Subsidiary staffing  
 
The strategic choice of subsidiary staffing is related to a number of trade-offs. The 
transfer of routines, organizational practices, technology know-how, and 
institutional culture will be most efficient through the use of expatriate. Thus the 
expatriate functions as a bridge for headquarters to spread its organizational 
knowledge to the subsidiary, together with the technological know-how and the 
managerial skills and standards. More, the expatriates would increase the 
efficiency of the communication channel between headquarter and the subsidiary, 
both with regards to formal and informal communications mechanisms (Fang, 
Makino, & Beamish, 2010). However, Fang et al. (2010) emphasizes that as the 
subsidiary evolves and gain experiences, the value and influences of the expatriate 
in the knowledge transfer, may diminish with time. The routines and structure will 
evolve and result in sustainable relationship with the subsidiary regardless to 
whether the subsidiary staff, or manager, is an expat or a local. The strategic issue 
                                                 
4 Institutional distance refers to differences in the regulative, normative and the cultural-cognitive 
aspects of the institutional environment. The regulative aspects include e.g. the intellectual 
property regime in a country, the judicial system for law enforcement, and the system of 
government. (Gaur et al. (2007)  
5 Parent country nationals that resides in the foreign market  
6 Host country nationality 
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should be related to what kind of control and knowledge that is required in the 
subsidiary. If the SME requires marketing know-how, institutional knowledge or 
acknowledge the lack of local market knowledge- then the expatriate would be of 
less value. In those circumstances, a local would hold knowledge related to the 
local market and would swiftly be able to share the required knowledge within the 
organization (Fang, Makino, & Beamish, 2010). If the organization holds a desire 
for such information, then a local would be of more value than an expatriate. 
Often a newly established subsidiary would need to develop ties to the local 
industry and the variety of potential customers, shortly after inception. This trade-
off would require carefull attention prior to establishment and would be a 
significant variable in the success of the subsidiary. The key variable is the 
identification of which knowledge that is most vital for the realization of the 
subsidiary operations.  
 
2.7.5  Types of knowledge  
 
This research will base the knowledge into three categories. The identification and 
processing of these types of knowledge are important for the ability to analyze and 
define the subsidiary requirem ents and its need for resources. Gaur et al. (2007) 
refers to strategic organizational values and practices, technological knowledge 
and informal knowledge. The first type of knowledge is regarded to the formal and 
informal structure and standards of the firm. Company culture, employee behavior 
and organizational routines would typically be included in this type of knowledge. 
Some firms may leverage this type of knowledge as a competitive advantage. The 
technological knowledge is related to the firm s’ qualifications toward product 
development, R&D, specialized operational knowledge, processes and proprietary 
know-how (Fang, Makino, & Beamish, 2010). A high-tech com pany would often 
focus its marketing activities  and its  resources towards the em phasis to this 
category of knowledge. The third group of knowledge is related to the firm s’ 
capability to analyze, un derstand and penetrate the m arket. The ability to build 
brands, develop marketing strategies and distribute products and services are also 
a vital element of the marketing knowledge (Fang, Makino, & Beamish, 2010). In 
the internationalization process of  a SM E, the firm  would probably require all 
types of knowledge. However, som e types of knowledge are m ore critical than 
others in regards to indus try specific dem ands. Also the type of services or 
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products provided by the fir m would affect the types of knowledge needed. The 
types of knowledge required will affect the strategic subsidiary staffing, which 
again affect the social capital the firm  holds. The social capital will affect the 
subsidiary’s ability to a cquire the requested resources, lin kages and knowledge 
required for successful foreign op erations. The faster and m ore economically the 
newly established subsidiary achieve competitiveness by acquiring resources and 
turning them into firm specific capabilities, the better (Han, 2006). 
 
 
 
Summary  
 
In this research we propose that the SME will be affected by the decisions 
performed prior, during and post establishment. The various literatures presented 
are expected to be relevant for the discussion of the various SMEs in the sample 
and the explanation for their choices. The presented literature is somewhat 
interdependent and is not introduced as a perception of how the firms operate or 
implement decisions. However, it is expected that the literature presented provides 
a fair introduction and discussion to the topics related to the challenges in the 
internationalization processes of an SME.   
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3 Methodology and Data Collection  
 
The examination of the firms and their in ternationalization process has been 
performed by the use of a case stu dy method. This experim ental methodology 
enabled us to develop a thoroughly unde rstanding of the internationalization 
process of the participating SME’s. We are not able to generalize our findings due 
to the fact that only 7 firm s (SMEs) were investigated, basically from one 
geographically cluster. However, in m ost of these com panies interviews was 
conducted both with decision makers at  headquarters in Norway and with 
subsidiary managers in Houston. Mo reover, the population was expanded to 
include two f acilitators in Housto n, four larger Norwegian com panies as key  
informants and one American company as key informant. This approach increased 
the perspective and enabled a better unde rstanding of the internationalization 
process towards the U.S market.  
 
The research instrument in use was in-dep th interviews with m anagers of 
SMEs, in Bergen and in Houston 7. The central idea of such studies is to look at 
cases in order to develop theory induc tively (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). In 
terms of the underlying philosophy of this  method, there exist differences am ong 
academics regarding the right way to p erform case stud ies. For ou r study, th e 
constructionist research design is deemed appropriate, as it assumes that «there is 
no absolute truth, and the job of the researcher should be to establish how various 
claims for trust and reality become constructed in everyday life» (Easterby-Smith 
et al, 2008: 48). To collect the data,  a qualitative method was applied through in-
depth interviews, meaning that the data collected is mainly in the form of words 
(Easterby-Smith et al, 2008). 
 
The main purpose of the interviews was to get a thorough understanding of 
the managers’ (both in HQ’ and subsidiaries) view on the situation in their own 
companies, the perceptions they had about the process of internationalization , and 
how they explained their own decisions. Un likely this would not be achievable to 
reveal by having a fixed questionnaire, yet certain aspects and topics was included 
                                                 
7 Two semi-structured interview guides are included in appendix 
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throughout the interviews in order to ge t sufficient knowledge about the research 
topics. This resulted in the use of a  semi-structured guide, with a topic guide for 
the interviewers to use in order to ensure th at all top ics were covered. The 
language to be used in the interviews is Norwegian in Bergen and English in 
Houston. Yet, m ost research objects in Houston were Norwegian and were 
allowed to speak th eir native language. All data and c itations are kept in its 
original language, thus eliminating the risk of  translation errors.  All in terviews 
was recorded and transcribed with pe rmission from the resea rch object in  
accordance with research ethics.  The data is stored anonym ous only with  
description of some key variables and features.  
 
3.1  The research questions 
 
This research includes a great variation of topics covered by various fields of the 
present literature available. The interview guide is based from the existing 
literature covering numerous themes within the field of internationalization. This 
broad theoretical perspective may contribute to gather richer data than if the 
perspective was narrower. The overlying research question is formulated as 
follows: 
 
How does high-tech SMEs from the subsea cluster perceive and deal with the 
market entry process, and how do they manage to overcome the challenges of 
internationalization?  
 
To specify, this research question is also divided into three underlying, more 
narrowed questions.   
 
1) How does high-tech SMEs from the subsea cluster perceive and deal with 
the market entry process challenges towards establishment in Houston?  
2) How important are networks in overcoming the barriers of 
internationalization, and how do SMEs utilize the network effects and 
benefits?  
3)  What managerial competencies and social capital is necessary to exploit 
a successful structure of a subsidiary?  
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This research will elucidate on different perspectives of the different topics, yet 
does not aim to draw any conclusions. The key informants and facilitators are 
used to comment on the perspective of the SMEs. The following table illustrate 
the numbers that refers to facilitators and key informants.  
   
 
3.2  Population and sample 
 
The original population of this research was small and medium sized firms 
(SMEs) from the NCE Subsea cluster in Bergen, all with a core focus on subsea 
oil and gas activities. In a number of companies we interviewed representatives 
from both headquarter and subsidiary. This was done in separate interviews. 
However, to broaden the perspective three more groups have been added to the 
sample. Firstly, facilitators as The Norwegian Seamen’s Church and Innovation 
Norway are interviewed in Houston. Their perspective gave general inputs 
towards the perception of the Norwegian companies’ market entry challenges. We 
also included a group of larger Norwegian companies to broaden the perspective 
of market entry processes in Houston. Some of these firms also had longer 
experience in Houston, and had reached a stage of higher performance than the 
SMEs in the sample. More, it was interesting to examine whether larger firms had 
other experiences than smaller firms.  These firms did also have Norwegian 
representatives and only the subsidiary was interviewed. The firms were selected 
on the base of being in the same industry with more or less the same type of 
services or products. All firms included can be defined as high-technology 
oriented firms with a specialization towards the demand within the oil and gas 
industry. All companies also originated from Norway.  
  
The last group only includes one object. This group is perceived as American 
companies. The respondent in this group was a Norwegian which had lived and 
worked in America the last 12 years. The last 8 years he has been the CEO of a 
wholly owned American company. The perspective of this group enabled the 
research to confront the perspective of foreigners with a (virtually) native 
perspective.  
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The following table is an overview of the companies and key informants included 
in this research. All informants are given a source to track throughout the text. 
The information given in the table is limited as an effort to process all participants 
anonymously. The different informants are referred to by the number from the 
table, when citations from managers are used in the paper. This gives the reader 
indication to which type of firm that the manager is situated in.  
 
 
 
Org: Office Number: Place of 
interview: 
Key Informant HQ 1.a Norway, Bergen 
Key Informant Sub 1.b Norway, Bergen 
Key Informant Sub 1.b.2 America, Houston
Key Informant American HQ 10.k America, Houston
SME Sub 11.b America, Houston
Facilitator  Facilitator 12.k America, Houston
SME Sub 13.b America, Houston
SME Sub 14.b America, Houston
SME HQ 2.a Norway, Bergen 
SME Sub  2.b America, Houston
SME HQ 3.a Norway, Bergen 
SME Sub 3.b America, Houston
SME HQ 4.a America, Houston
SME HQ 5.a Norway, Bergen 
SME HQ 6.a Norway, Bergen 
SME HQ 7.a Norway, Bergen 
Key Informant Sub 8.b America, Houston
SME Sub 9.b America, Houston
Key Informant Sub 15.b America, Houston
SME Sub 16.b America, Houston
SME Sub 17.b America, Houston
Key Informant Sub 18.b America, Houston
SME Sub 19.b America, Houston
Facilitator  Facilitator 20.b America, Houston
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Key Informant Sub 21.b America, Houston
  
The Norwegian headquarters were interviewed during summer of 2011. Most of 
these interviews were performed together with our mentor. She has a wide 
experience by the use of in depth, semi structured interviews and secured the 
methodology and efficiency of the interviews. The subsidiaries and key 
informants in Houston were interviewed during winter 2012, without our mentor. 
Citations are kept in the original language of the informants/key informants. Some 
external and internal factors may vary during these points of time and may be a 
limitation of the research. Also the financial crisis of 2008/2009 may also have its 
implications of the firms’ experiences related to performance and degree of 
success in Houston.  
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4. Analysis of empirical findings 
 
4.1 The firms’ international experience, assets and networks pre‐entry 
This research includes interviews with both managers at headquarters in Norway 
and managers from the subsidiaries in Houston. The com panies that we 
interviewed had differing backgrounds and international experience prior to their 
entry into the Houston oil industry. The largest companies had extensive 
international experience, which contributed  to a high share of net incom es from 
foreign activities. In  those la rger companies, most managers had m ore 
international experience as expats or as managers of foreign operations, than from 
the smaller ones. Overall, these larger companies performed better and had a more 
long-term strategy, due to financial streng ths and access to m ore resources. Most 
of the smaller companies had limited or minimal international experience prior to 
their establishment in Houston. On th e other hand, som e managers in these 
companies had intern ational experience from prior job positions in other 
companies.  This m anagerial competence made it possible for organizations to 
overcome the cultu ral differences that exist between Norwegian and  American 
businesses (in accord with Agndal et.al. 2008).  
Some companies have had extensive expe riences selling produc ts and services 
internationally, although this was through agents or by being a sub-contractor for 
an MNC localized in Norway. This  relationship is defined as piggybacking8 and 
illustrates a mode where larg er companies pull small and m edium sized 
enterprises (SME) towards intern ational operations. Managers from SMEs  
perceived these relationships with e xperienced MNCs critical to obtain 
international sales and activ ities. The piggybacking relati onships were a mode to 
start up international activities with less risk and commitment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Piggybacking: A form of marketing collaboration where firms seek to achieve a goal by allying 
with partners that complement their strengths and weaknesses. Piggybacking consists of both a 
carrier and a rider, where the carrier markets the rider’s products  (Terpstra & Chwo-Ming , 1990) 
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Technology – an important asset 
Our informants pe rceived their own organizations  as well developed and 
technologically advanced within their field. Nearly all companies were running 
operations in the Norwegian offshore sector and perceived this as their hom e 
market, prior to their establishment in Houston. Several informants argued that the 
North Sea was one of the best areas in the global oil ind ustry to dev elop and 
implement new technology. They pointed to the advances of Statoil and the 
Norwegian government, which enables com panies to receive s ubsidies and other 
financial support and tax benefits, as the key drivers to facilit ate development of 
high technology. All informants perceived their com panies’ technology and 
associated competence as their m ain competitive advantage. Most seemed 
confident that their technology was unique and state of the art. One Norwegian 
manager in an American company shared this perception: 
 «… det er litt look to Norway, man er nok litt fascinert på det som har skjedd i 
Norge og man er nok mest fasinert av at Norge har klart å utvikle en teknologi til 
tross for de høye kostnader...»  
- CEO, American Company (ref: 10.k) 
Here the Norwegian m anagers we in terviewed explain the we ll-developed 
technology within the oil industry itsel f and how the Norwegian governm ent 
facilitates the testing and generation of new technologies. Strict regulations and a 
beneficial taxation system  are highli ghted as reasons to why Norwegian 
companies are leaders in R&D and actual deploym ent of new technologies 
worldwide.   
«På grunn av skattesystemet til oljeselskapene dekker staten 78 % av kostnadene, 
bedriftene betaler kun 22 % av kostnadene selv. Norge har vært og vi håper at det 
skal fortsette å være lukrativt å utvikle og teste ut teknologi på norsk sektor» 
  - Norwegian HQ manager (Ref: 3.a)  
Even though m ost of the com panies we observed b enefitted from this 
technological advantage, som e of them  suffered from the lack of international 
experience and a substantial business ne twork. Many of the firm s had som e 
international experience from other markets, but these experiences were not easily 
GRA 19003 – Master Thesis     01.09.2012  
Page 37 
transferrable to Houston, due to distance and cultural differences. The sam e goes 
for international networks; most companies had to build new networks in Houston 
in order to market and distribute their new technologies. 
The smaller companies, especially, suffered from limited financial and managerial 
resources to initiate their internationalization process. Lately, researchers have 
observed this tendency of   rapid interna tionalization even for small firms. On a 
general basis, increased global c ompetition and acce lerating technological 
development cause this new tendency (J ohanson & Valhne, 2003). The following 
citation illustrates a typical situation for SMEs that internationalize:   
“Vi hadde ikke noen annen internasjonal erfaring før Houston annet enn at som 
enkeltpersoner så har vi vært involvert i internasjonale prosjekter….Vi er jo et 
selskap som har bygd stein på stein. Business først, så bygger vi organisasjonen 
etterpå. Sånn at vi har på mange måter hatt en ambisjon om at vi tjener penger 
mens vi går. Vi ser forskjellige modeller der de bygger opp svære organisasjoner 
og skal ut å vinne verden. Vi kommer nok fra en litt annen mentalitet og 
kultur….Og vi har nok blitt belastet mer enn vi burde…“  
- Norwegian HQ Manager (Ref: 2.a)  
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4.2 Pre-entry strategy and process 
This chapter identifies the pre-entry strategy and processes prior to th e entry and 
establishment in Houston. The objectiv e is to clarify the reasons why 
internationalization towards Houston is of  such importance f or these Norwegian 
high-tech companies. Moreover, this chapter will discuss the plans and processes 
that accompanied these pre-entry practices.  
 
4.2.1 Motives for international expansion  
Firms’ operating in the oil industry is limited to geographical exposure to other oil 
markets because of the scarcity of oil hot spots in the world. Thus lays a psychic 
distance problem for firms operating in Norway to enter markets around the 
world, to Houston and to other international oil hubs. This leads to an expansion 
plan according to the geographical distribution of oil regions around the world (cf. 
2.3.4). The firms in our sample emphasized product specific, target country 
specific and global niche markets as important motives for internationalization. 
Hence they had  less regard to high psychic distance implications, which is in 
accord with Burgel and Murray (2000). More, strategic exploitation and country 
specifics was regarded as more important to the firms than psychic distance, 
which is a strategy contrary to the Uppsala model.   
We gathered from our discussion from sources at headquarters and subsidiaries, 
that the companies’ internationalization process is driven by two main 
factors/motives. Firstly, several managers highlight the need to expand into new 
markets (the push factor).  Even though activities and operations in the 
Norwegian subsea industry are substantial, most companies chose to expand 
globally to be able to grow and exploit their technological investments. Search of 
new markets and market shares are therefore one of two key motives. The second 
motive is the large and attractive market in Houston and the Gulf of Mexico 
(GOM) (the pull factor). Most managers consider the market potential in Houston 
(or GOM) as larger compared to the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS), 
especially for some type of technologies. Some companies with special 
technologies searched for a market with different market needs than found in 
Norway. A few companies even stated that they had to be present in Houston in 
order to execute crucial R&D practices. The Norwegian industry was said not to 
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hold enough demand for specific products or technologies. Houston represents a 
market with greater variety in technological demands, and the number of 
important decision makers in the oil industry is substantial. The argument of 
Houston being a hub within the oil and gas industry was also frequently addressed 
as an important motive to why one should be present. Burgel and Murray (2000) 
state that firms with high technological competencies exploit their commercial 
value as more important than the psychic distance, which explains why most of 
the Norwegian subsea firms do not follow the Uppsala model for 
internationalization.   
  
 
Why Houston is important 
“Houston is still considered as the hub of the oil and gas industry - globally. No 
matter how hard Stavanger and Aberdeen try they will never equal that. So, a lot 
of business is routed through Houston, even if it originates – let’s say- in Bergen. 
I don’t think you can really be a global player in this industry if you don’t have an 
office here in Houston. You are almost expected to be here. “ 
- American Subsidiary Manager (Ref: 9.b)  
Most managers agreed that Houston  is the world’s leading  energy center for oil 
and gas production. Houston is characterized by a diversified oil and gas industry, 
with a m assive number of organizations, especially within engineering and the 
larger MNCs in the subsea field. Most important is the argument that all the major 
operators and decision m akers are localized in Hous ton. Executives in Houston 
implement decisions not only with regards to the Gulf of Mexico, but also towards 
Africa, Asia, and the North Sea sectors.  On e manager stated that his first contract 
won in Houston was a project back in Bergen. For global MNCs, m ost of the 
contracts and projects are distributed, signed and cont rolled from offices in 
Houston. The city is perceived as the en ergy city with the world’s largest budget 
spending. Not necessarily due to activities in  the Gulf of Mexico, but with regard 
to activities in oil provinces worldw ide controlled by companies in Houston. 
Managers explained that even if you do not intend to sell  products and services in 
the GOM, Houston is s till of great im portance due to the  global interf erence 
exercised from Houston.  
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“Jeg kan gi deg en rekke eksempler på strategier og toppbestemmelsene som 
gjøres ut fra Houston. Her har du alle hovedkvarterer til alle hovedselskaper og 
volumene er jo enestående stor. Så premissene legges av mange selskaper her i 
Houston.”     
- Norwegian Subsidiary Manager (Ref: 1.b)  
However, some key informants stressed the importance to consider future changes 
in the oil industry. They pointed out that Houston’s global position could change 
due to the emerging oil countries intensifying use of local content. The emergence 
of Brazil as an important oil hub is argued to have great effect of the for mation of 
the oil industry.  
“Slik jeg oppfatter det var alt innom Houston for 10 år siden. Nå utvikler ting seg 
annerledes og Brasil er et godt eksempel på det. Med økende krav til Local 
Content og økende modning av disse miljøer, er det bare å innse at det ikke lenger 
hjelper å være i Houston om man vil inn i de områdene. Jeg er ikke sikker på om 
Houston vil ha samme relevans de neste 10 år, som det Houston har hatt de siste 
10 år…»  
- CEO, American Company (ref: 10.k) 
 
Whatever future chan ge, Houston is still an im portant channel to access  
information about international projects. As noted by a few m anagers, Norwegian 
firms’ presence in Houston has increased  their knowledge of the global industry, 
customer needs, market and technology. On the other hand, some of the managers 
stressed the risk of perceiving Houst on as important due to lower cost of  
production and employees. Even though la bor and production could be available  
at a lower price, th e efficiency and quali ty were considered equivalently lower. 
Most companies therefore continued to  develop technology and to carry out 
production in the Bergen region for delivery to Houston (GOM).  
Due to the recen t safety regulation s and standards following the oil s pill in the 
Gulf, new technologies and products are needed. If Norwegian firm s source 
manufacturing in the United States they can  take advantage of economies of scale 
and lower deployment times, with the transfer of tacit and explicit knowledge for 
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production being sim plified with the subs idiary in Houston. This will enable 
Norwegian technology to be put to use, pr oven effective, and thus gaining market 
share. But several m anagers emphasized that without full investm ent in the 
American market, both on the business si de and manufacturing, Norwegian firms 
will not possess the capacity that American firms can find confidence investing in.  
 
 
 
4.2.2 Lack of pre‐entry plans and strategy 
“Vi hadde tro på at markedet der borte hadde behov for den teknologien som vi 
representerer. Så har veien videre vært smertefull, vi har lært mye på den, det har 
kostet oss mye, men vi er der fortsatt“ 
- Norwegian Head Quarter Manager (Ref: 2.a) 
  
Many companies suffered from great challenges in the early phase of assimilation 
in Houston. Organizational m otives were clear, but not well translated into plans 
and strategies. Managers from  the subsidiary and headquarters m ostly stated that 
few plans were written in advance. T ypically, a lim ited number of m anagers 
carried out the p re-entry strategy process in close relation with the board of  
directors. This accord with Crick & Jone s (2000) who revealed th at many firms 
make their m arket-selection decision based on the previous international 
experience of the managers involved. The same authors found that the firms often 
lack sufficient financial funds, knowledge about the foreign m arket,  and 
international networks. As a result f irms typically re ly on their  existing 
relationship with other firms to identify and exploit specific business opportunities  
(Agndal, Chetty , & Wilson, 2008).  
Among the firm s it seem s as the strategy process, the m arket analysis and the 
decision-making process were perform ed in a rather quick m anner. Informants 
especially in SMEs explained this by the limited number of decision makers in the 
firm, the close relationship with the board  of directors and the lesser em phasis on 
plans and strategic processes within SMEs.  
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“Ting skjer veldig fort i et slikt selskap…Det er det både fordeler og ulemper med 
selvfølgelig. Vi har ikke særlig klare langsiktige planer på det, det blir litt sånn ad 
hoc-planer. Av og til gjør man ting som ikke er godt nok overveid, men av og til 
slipper man de lange diskusjonene som drar ut. Man tar en avgjørelse og så får 
man den gjennomført.» 
-  Norwegian Head Quarter Manager (Ref: 7.a) 
A majority of m anagers seemed confident to carry out m arket entry processes 
without detailed plans or clear strategies . Managers stated not to know how the 
process could have been executed dif ferently. They agreed that they had to “learn 
as they walk” and they were often willing to perform a trial period of 3-5 years. A 
mentality of “trial and error” appeared to be u sual as they were acclimated with  
taking high risks. A few m anagers with in ternational experience also pointed to 
experience with establishm ents in e.g. Br azil (high psychic distance) to explain 
that there was less need to m ake plans and carry out m arket analysis when 
entering Houston (low psychic distance).  This perception of low psychic distance 
with regard to Houston m ay be one of the reasons why Norwegian firm s have 
experienced stagnant returns in the U.S. in the first years of mar ket entry. The 
firms (SMEs) used less tim e to make strategies and plans to enter Houston 
because they perceived  this m arket as less co mplicated on many aspects. The 
majority of the m anagers in our sam ple underestimated the socio-cultural  
conditions in term s of the business envi ronment. A few of the m anagers even 
perceived the process of m arket entry in Houston equal to  establishing a 
subsidiary in Norway. This finding is consistent with Pedersen & Petersen (2004) 
who found that managers tend to believe they have knowledge about the foreign 
market prior to entry, whereas they real ize their lack of knowledge and post entry 
and experience a shock effect during the f irst years af ter the establishment. This  
effect is not examined in ours research, yet several managers in the sample argued 
that they perceived the cultu ral distance to the U.S m arket to be closer  prior to  
entry, than post entry. Thus our findings acco rds with previous research revealing 
that the shock effect- is the largest in close distant m arkets and lower in high 
distant markets. Norwegian m anagers in the study  stated that they had low- 
psychic distance toward the U.S. This m ay lead to a scenario where  m anagers 
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underestimate the challenges and inequalities in the establishment process into the 
U.S market.  
Other informants, however, stressed the importance of making plans and carrying 
out a strategic process. The most used argument for having thorough plans and 
strategies before market entry is  the costs of m aking mistakes post entry. 
Researchers such as Forsgreen (2002) s uggest that plan and strategy m ay be 
developed from either imitation or by ac quiring other companies or hiring local 
managers. By im itation, the f irm still ha s a level of  uncertainty and decides to 
follow or copy the actions of other f irms. The second suggestion is to increase the 
speed in the internationalization by ac quiring local companies or personnel that 
possesses the necessary market knowledge. These approaches may be of value as 
there are substantial costs related to th e establishment and the operations of a 
subsidiary, even in the early phas e. An expat could potentially cost the com pany 
2,5 – 3,5 m illion NOK annually 9. The cost of not being able to reach efficiency 
and progress shortly after start up, are considered significant. Experienced 
managers argue that the early phase of establishment often is strongly 
miscalculated because the proper measures  in addressing cultural differences in 
the workplace are often overlooked. Com panies often do not have the patience or 
the proper perception of the tim e required in establishing, adapting and 
functioning in a foreign society. 
One concern is that Norwegian HQ m anagers normally underestimate the 
difficulties to sell Norwegian tech nology in Houston. E ven though the firm s’ 
technology is well established and holds a high reputation in Norway, most firms  
struggled to sell the tec hnology in Houston. This m isperception therefore led to 
less planning and analysis before m arket entry. For smaller high-tech firm s, 
Knight & Cavusgil (1996) found that  networks, often acquired pre-
internationalization could interfere w ith the f irms capabilities to f ormulate 
international strategies and plans. These findings could fit data from our study, as 
managers stated their international network was of limited scale, prior to entry. On 
the contrary, it should be noted that a fe w companies did in fact conduct planning 
and strategy processes prior to expansi on. The research displays that m anagers 
with extensive international experience were more like ly to carry out p lans and 
                                                 
9 Stated by Key Informant, Houston ( Ref: 12.k)  
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strategy processes prior to their esta blishment in Houston. However, few  
subsidiary managers were included in the strategy process pre-entry. The fe w 
subsidiary managers that were included in this process often contributed with 
perspectives that chang ed the initial strategy.  It appears  that the e ffects of 
including the subsidiary managers in the process pre-entry are im portant and 
valuable. 
 
4.3 Market entry strategy and process 
This chapter will discuss the fo cus on the plans of the early phase of 
establishment. At this point of time, a strategic entry decision has been made. The 
discussion will be related to the first steps and processes towards establishing the 
subsidiary. Moreover, the chapter will explain the market entry mode, the startup 
process, the choice of expats versus local ’s managers, and the recruitment process 
of human capital.  
 
4.3.1 Choice of market entry mode 
Informants mentioned four different en try modes to enter the Houston m arket: 
agents, joint ventures, acquisitions, and w holly owned subsidiaries. Virtually all 
the companies chose to establish their own wholly owned subsidiary. This finding 
accord with Burgel & Murray (2000 ), who claim that product complexity and the 
need for customer interaction often affect the choice of entry modes.  
Even though these com panies varied with re spects to their previous international 
experience, there was less variation regarding the chosen entry mode. None of the 
companies in our sam ple chose to enter Houston through low risk m odes in the 
market entry. Low risk m odes are typical ly licensing, franchising and use of 
agents (Gatignon, 1986). Most companies chose high-risk modes through Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI). The term FD I refers to the process in which an 
organization invests in a business unit outside of their hom e country or as cross-
border expenditures to acquire or expand corporate control of productive assets 
(Froot, 1993). Different m odes of FDI are wholly owned subsidiaries, joint 
ventures and acquisitions.  
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Different market entry modes  
The majority of managers either had a negative experience with trying to use other 
modes of entry, or did not even consider them. With respect to using agents, some 
informants meant this could be costly, due to high provisions. Others claimed that 
agents would give low prior ity to long-term sales projec ts such as sales of high 
technology from Norway that required high commitment. This research finding is 
supported by previous research (C avusgil, 2008) claim ing that products that 
require a longer period for im plementation are likely to suffer from  less focus of 
the agent. By this, the company risks the agents focus on the sales of products that 
result in the most imminent returns. That is also partially the explanation to why 
the Norwegian SMEs utilized agents less.  
Some companies had tried to enter through acquisitions or by joint ventures. Still 
they ended up with their own subsidiary. Difficulties to find potential partners and 
a low degree of transparency were major reasons for not choosing these modes. A 
few managers also explained that due to the size of their own company and lack of 
financial resources, they faced great difficulties in acquiring a U.S. company. 
«Vi prøvde å høre om det var virksomheter i Houston som passet for oss å kjøpe 
istedenfor å etablere oss. Men vi hadde ikke på det tidspunkt noen eiere som 
hadde veldig store ønsker og vilje til å bruke veldig mye penger på det. I Houston 
ble vi bare møtt med kalde skuldre, de var ikke interessert i å bli eid av noen 
norske, det var helt ute. Så derfor fant vi ut at vi må bare få oss et lokale og gjøre 
det selv.»  
- Norwegian Head Quarter Manager (Ref: 4.a)  
 
Product complexity  
Managers emphasized that di rect export through wholly owned subsidiaries were 
resource demanding and recognized that with outh allying with a partner, the firm 
will not gain any acces s to networks or experiences working through a partn er. 
Yet the firms had the cont rol over their know-how and operations. The managers 
at HQ that we interviewed agreed that this mode of operation had a high degree of 
risk, required m ore commitment, and i nvolved using substantial financial 
resources. Yet, the choice of this m ode of entry was easier to choose in Houston 
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than in o ther foreign m arkets. There were s everal reasons that exp lained this 
shared view. One reaso n highlighted is  that co mpanies perceived the cultu ral 
distance between Norway and Houston to be minor and therefore manageable.   
«I Houston tok vi mye mer risiko og valgte å etablere oss sjøl i eget selskap. Det 
er mange grunner til det, men det var nok riktig å gjøre i den settingen der borte. 
Det var annerledes for oss i Houston. Vi pleier å finne oss en tung partner, også 
gå inn på en avtale under vingene til noen som er lokal, som tar vekk disse 
grensene vi sliter med som kultur kollisjoner, økonomisk praksis, også videre også 
videre. I Houston så gjorde vi det motsatte…»  
- Norwegian Head Quarter Manager (Ref:1.a) 
At present, all com panies had an operational wholly ow ned subsidiary. We  
noticed that several co mpanies lacked experience in the star t-up phase of this 
high-risk entry mode. The establishment process was often initiated by the CEO  
or the board of directors, with a Norw egian skilled en gineer as an expat,  
responsible for the start-up of the subsid iary. A number of the com panies faced 
limitations with reg ards to equity,  previous experience, international network, 
strategic focus, and marketing an alysis. For SMEs with lim ited financial and 
human resources, Rasheed (2005) found that  the entry m ode decision should be 
regarded as a trade-off between focus in  the home market and the foreign market. 
An equity mode of foreign operations (as wholly owned) requires substantial 
financial and hum an resources. By this, th e transfer of resources to the foreign 
market may endanger the emphasis of activities and development in the domestic 
market. The findings of Rasheed (2005) indicate that SMEs can experience a 
higher market performance through exporting (non-equity mode) if the dom estic 
industrial growth is high. Most m anagers responded that they perceived the 
Norwegian industry to represent great demand with a forecast of increased 
demand due to new oil disc overies. However, Tseng ( 2007) supports the use of 
wholly owned entities if the firm possesses resources such as specific know-how 
or unique technology that should not be leaked to other actors. This is stated to be 
the most efficient m ode to exploit com petitive advantages without the risk of 
diluting the know-how. In this regard, th e theory fits the findings with the 
managers that perceive their know-how to  be their m ost valuable competitive 
advantage. 
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Socio‐cultural differences  
Many of the managers we interviewed noted a feeling of mistrust from americans 
firms when they arrived to Houston. Am erican managers were skeptic, with 
regard to w hether Norwegian firms’ com petencies, products and services could 
apply to the Am erican market and to th eir overall commitment in Houston. This 
was also confirm ed by our key inform ants who e mphasized that Norwegian 
companies need to establish subsidiaries with a long-term perspective to succeed. 
American managers had to be ensure d about Norwegian com panies’ real 
engagement and commitm ent in H ouston, and did fear that newcom ers could 
disappear suddenly from  the m arket. Norwegian subsidiaries therefore had to 
convince potential American business partners through intensive networking and 
product demonstration that they had a long- term commitment and were a credible 
partner to deal with.  
"Skal du pre kvalifisere deg så må du inn og snakke med bedriftene for å komme 
med på bidders list, og eneste måte å komme på bidders list; det er at du kan 
overbevise dem om at du har kommet hit for å bli"  
 - Key Informant, Houston (Ref: 12.k) 
Most informants and key-informants perceived American businesses to be very 
traditional and conservative in their business methods. Americans were known to 
prefer to do business with those firms they have had long-term and mutually 
beneficial relations with.  Hence, Norwegian firms had to deal with and adapt to 
traditional and conservative American businesses. Therefore, Norwegian subsea 
companies chose entry modes with higher risk in the early phase of 
internationalization. The choice of entry modes by the Norwegian subsea 
companies contradicts the Uppsala model that presumes that firms usually select 
entry modes associated with lower risk in the early phase of internationalization, 
and gradually advances to higher risk entry modes in parallel with knowledge 
accumulation and experience (Johanson & Vahlne 1977). In Houston, it seemed 
important to select a strategy and market plan that establishes the foreign 
subsidiary for long-term purposes. This gives the American companies a 
reassurance that the subsidiary is established to compete in the American market.  
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The oil industry has been a staple in the United States, the adaption of products 
and practices that facilitate a long-term orientation are crucial. Hofstede proposed 
that the American society is rather lax when it comes to focusing on the future, 
with short-term financial goals and bottom lines being more important, which 
does no justice in describing the oil industry in the U.S. Subsea oil products need 
to be produced and effectively made to withstand long-term weathering and use 
conditions, although this is somewhat assumed with the products, so it should be 
the focus and availability of service. Managers emphasized that establishment of 
subsidiaries in Houston is obviously a significant challenge, but showing internal 
strength through external practices aimed at tailoring goods for the customer both 
pre sale and post deployment will give American businesses the comfort of 
knowing they have invested in the right products and services for the long haul. 
Additionally several managers expressed that Americans are skeptical towards 
expats who are staying in the country. It seems many US managers fear doing 
business with newly established foreign subsidiaries due to the uncertainty of their 
life span and survival  in the U.S. market.  
"Vi har også hørt den at åja, du er en av de norske som prøver å etablere her 
borte- så forsvinner hele selskapet om et år- det vil vi ikke."   
- Norwegian Subsidiary Manager (Ref: 2.b) 
 
4.3.2 Market and technology barriers in the market entry process 
"De som tror Amerika er likt Norge, altså det er kulturmessig og businessmessig, 
så tror jeg forskjellene er så store som jeg tror de kan bli. Mye mer forskjellig enn 
vi som Nordmenn tror, vi tror USA er så likt også vi vet hva USA er-, og det gjør 
vi ikke. Det er totalt to verdener." 
  - Norwegian Head Quarter Manager (Ref: 1.a)   
This section highlights the many challenging obstacles that Norwegian companies 
face while establishing subsidiaries in Houston. Cultural differences, and the 
existence of entry barriers and the methods used to overcome them by SMEs will 
be examined.  
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Technology and industrial cultural barriers 
Key informants (both Norwegian and Americans) explained that American 
businesses were fascinated with the scientific advancements offered through 
Norwegian technology. Still, many companies found it difficult to turn the interest 
into revenues. A number of the Norwegian managers argued that their products 
were superior in terms of advanced technology and effectiveness, while on the 
other hand, it seems as the American companies distinguish the Norwegian 
technology as an unnecessary cost. This is simply not understanding cultural 
differences but differences that exist between society and industry, more 
specifically the conservative oil industry in the United States.  
"(…)det er en anerkjennelse at det norske miljøet ligger langt fremme teknologisk, 
men det er likevel en kultur som sier at vi vet nok best sjøl." 
- Norwegian Head Quarter Manager (Ref: 4.a) 
Informants in Houston agreed that it was essential to adapt Norwegian technology 
to the American market. Norwegian firms needed to adapt and respond m ore to 
local industry, and to the culture in which they resided. It was also expressed by 
many managers that Norwegian firms needed to be more aggressive in marketing 
and informing Am erican businesses about the benefits of the innovative 
technology that had to offer. The refore, we argue that   Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions prove to be ineffective in  assessing the oil industry.  Am erican 
managers needed to feel confidence, both proven and socially, in the products 
they sourced. We learned through one inte rview that American managers showed 
doubt in N orwegian products. This could be due to the way Norwegian firm s 
market their products. In the United States , masculinity flourishes, which is quite 
opposite from the way things are in Norw ay. If Norwegian m anagers boast their 
products specs and benefits, and not assum e they will be proven through trial, we 
believe more attention and opportunity wi ll come from it. It is alm ost like 
American managers need to be assure d socially that the products they are 
investing in are the be st in the market. This is one significant cultural difference 
that exists. Norwegians tend to be more soft-spoken and humble, while Americans 
tend to bo ast about success with  confidence. But we learned th rough one 
interview that different approaches were taken, and this w as facilitated through 
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learning from a network partner in the U.S. market.  Yet, the Americ an oil 
industry seemed more conservative with respect to applying new technology.  
One informant explains:  
"De fleste som kommer over viser til at de har med ny teknologi. Men i Amerika er 
det det mest konservative markedet jeg vet om. De er ikke interessert i ny 
teknologi- de er interessert i noe som fungerer."  
- Key Informant, Houston (Ref: 12.k) 
American oil industry, since its beginnings has been characterized by a sense of 
conservatism, where companies tend to use technology that has proven results, 
and has been effective in the past. This is the general perception among 
informants and key informant. They also claimed that the American oil industry is 
less innovative and modern compared to the Norwegian oil industry. Another 
point, emphasized in interviews, that reinforces this technology conservatism is 
the weaker employment laws in the USA. Employees may risk losing their jobs if 
they make a mistake when encountering an important business decision, e.g. if 
they decide to use a technology that does not function or results in extra costs. Job 
security was stated to be a large constraint for firms attempting to adapt new 
technology in Houston. This observation is based on the perception that 
Norwegian technology must be proven and tested in the Gulf of Mexico prior to 
operation. Project managers prefer to use technology that has been used in a 
number of prior projects and has proven reliability. The risk of employing new 
technology in American companies is hindered on the notion that, if something 
were to go wrong, the purchaser might lose their job. Therefore, the difference in 
employment law and other regulations between Norway and the United States, is 
one factor that could explain the difference in adaption of new technology.  
Lately, however, informants and key informants have observed changes in the 
American oil industry. The Macondo oil spill in 201010, has led to changes in 
                                                 
10 On April 20, 2010 an explosion occurred on the Deepwater Horizon, a mobile offshore drilling 
rig, forty-one miles off the southeast coast of Louisiana. The rig was owned by Transocean, the 
world’s largest offshore drilling contractor, and leased to BP, one of the world’s largest energy 
companies. The explosion caused a blowout, killed 11 workers, and ignited a fire that led to the 
sinking of the rig. After the explosion, an attempt to activate the BOP failed, and oil started 
gushing into the Gulf of Mexico, causing horrific harm to the marine environment, fouling the 
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regulations and safety procedures that favor advanced and more environmental 
friendly technology. With this new outlook in the American oil industry, new 
opportunities can be created for Norwegian firms. However, as one key informant 
argued, one should still expect the purchase process of new technology to be 
performed in a slow pace, even with more strict specifications with   new safety 
regulations. 
“Avstanden fra at en kunde sier at dette er et spennende produkt og dette liker vi 
og dette kan vi tenke oss- til at de faktisk går inn og kjøper det; den er ganske 
stor. Igjen, Amerika er utrolig konservativt, ting tar tid og om du ikke har tid til å 
la den prosessen gå sin gang så bør du vurdere om dette er det rette markedet å 
gå inn i. “ 
- Key Informant Houston (Ref: 12.k)  
 
Shall you follow your customer? 
Several managers highlighted the im portance to follow im portant customers 
(MNCs) abroad. They of ten felt obliged to f ollow customers and establish a  
presence in Houston to m aintain and de velop the custom er relationship further. 
The MNCs express ed to the SME s that they valued highly their product and 
services, and needed them for continued operations abroad. T hese SMEs aimed to 
increase business with these cu stomers in n ew markets and stren gthening 
relationship bonds, while seeking to captiva te a long-term m utually beneficial 
relationship.    
“Vi følte egentlig at det var påkrevd at vi gjorde det, men vi kunne kanskje holdt 
igjen og t.o.m. ikke vært der enda, om vi virkelig hadde vært knipne. Men vi 
gjorde det for å utnytte mulighetene med dem best mulig. “ 
- Norwegian Head Quarter Manager (Ref: 6.a) 
Following the customer did not reduce risk s or challenges in the foreig n market. 
Some managers experienced difficulties to get in contact with the MNCs business 
                                                                                                                                     
shores of Alabama and resulting in multibillion dollar losses to the fishing and tourism industries, 
among others. Nearly three months after the deadly explosion, BP finally announced that it had  
capped the hemorrhaging well.  (Perry, 2011) 
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unit in Houston, even though the MNC’s unit in Norway had encouraged them  to 
go. One manager referred to this problem  as waterproof walls between business 
units in MNCs. Several SMEs had serious problem s with this, as the MNC wa s 
the most important motive to establish in Houston. A manager in HQ revealed this 
problem early in the pre entry phase:  
“…The MNC  sa at om vi skulle fortsette å være med de, så måtte vi være med de 
ut i verden. Og det betydde i første rekke Houston. Så spurte vi om vi fikk 
garantert leveranse om vi flytter bort til Houston? Nei, det fikk vi ikke, vi måtte 
bevise at det vi lagte var bra produkter. Det var ingen automatikk her.(…) Vi 
hadde egentlig lite valg, for skulle vi være med dem, så måtte vi være med dit. Så, 
men jeg vil jo si at de lot oss i stikken. Det gjorde de faktisk. I hvert fall 
umiddelbart. “  
- Norwegian Head Quarter Manager (Ref: 5.a)  
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4.4.1 The importance of business network - a barrier 
"Amerikanerne handler kun med folk de kjenner. Det betyr at du er nødt til å 
bygge nettverk." 
- Key Informant, Houston (Ref: 12.k) 
Nearly all managers emphasized the im portance of business networks to succeed 
in Houston. Substantial differences exist between Norwegian and Am erican 
perspectives on the im portance of business networki ng. Informants and key 
informants claimed that Am ericans emphasize personal and social aspects in 
business networking, and m entioned the im portance of golf, sporting events, 
going out f or lunch or dinner, and the sh aring of infor mation about fam ily and 
social issues. Socializing in informal settings and engaging in  soft conversations 
are critical in getting to know one another before talking business. Arenius (2005) 
emphasized the importance of substantial business networks, a nd that firms can 
overcome psychic distance by gaining direct experiential knowledge through their 
networks. Although Hofstede prescribes the U.S. as being a rather individualistic 
society, American business interaction is far from  that. A close business 
relationship enables trust to b e formed, which leads  to a re lationship that is 
mutually beneficial. Not only will the firms com plement each o ther with 
production, service, de ployment of em ployees, and also new  business 
opportunities can be realized through this network. The following quotes illustrate 
the above accounts:  
"Jada, du går ut og er sosial med dem. Og det er klart… Jeg liker ikke baseball, 
men du gjør det for du gjerne vil lære og så er du egentlig et lite barn som 
egentlig spør; hva skjer nå da? … Og amerikanerne vil like å fortelle om sine 
ting. Og da har du mye mer åpen dialog sammen med dem."  
- Norwegian Subsidiary Manager (Ref: 11.b) 
 
The ability to create an open dialog with the locals seems to be extremely 
important. Several managers mentioned that the social aspect contributes more to 
the exchange of information between the individuals because trust is built outside 
of the business setting. It seems like managers rely more on each other in private 
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settings than during a meeting in the office. SMEs in the initial stage of the 
internationalization process lack sufficient knowledge and resources (Chetty & 
Campbell, 2003). Therefore, a network can provide firms with an ability to 
identify and exploit specific business opportunities that would have been 
otherwise unattainable due to lack of resources (Agndal et al., 2008). Managers 
with international experience are more aware of the importance of networking, 
and through this experience, can leverage themselves a better undertaking in 
exploiting different business opportunities abroad (Arenius 2005). This is 
confirmed by several of the interviewed managers.  
"In our industry golf is it! And Friday afternoon, if you do not have a golf game 
then; what is wrong with you? You have a customer for four hours, he will tell you 
more on the golf course then what he can do in the office." 
  
-  American Subsidiary Manager (Ref: 9.b) 
 
Managers with international experience 
Lechner and Dowling (2003) emphasize that a manager’s network is the most 
important factor in overcoming the liability of newness when entering foreign 
markets. Only a limited number of the Norwegian subsea companies could rely on 
their managerial competence and network in order to overcome liability of 
newness in Houston. In the initial startup, most of the companies turn to 
organizations such as Intsok and Innovation Norway for advices and support. 
Some managers argue that Norwegian companies are in a fortunate situation, due 
to the valuable sourcing and assistance provided by these actors. Innovation 
Norway has been referred to as a door opener, one that has provided valuable 
market knowledge and given companies advice and recommendations for their 
future processes. Some HQ managers have suggested that the collaboration with 
Innovation Norway has provided them with valuable input and increased their 
understanding for the critical elements in the internationalization process. 
Innovation Norway comments that all Norwegian companies are welcome to 
discuss strategic plans and objectives with them and in turn receive valuable 
feedback in which most companies would benefit from. Some of the managers 
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also refer to the IFU11 contract which is provided by Innovation Norway. This 
contract facilitates firms with their first communication and cooperation with an 
international partner, a vital step of the internationalization process.  Managers 
based in Norway value the relation toward Innovation Norway more than 
managers of the subsidiaries in Houston. The reason for this is not 
straightforward, but the subsidiary manager mission, which is to control the 
establishment process rather than implement HQ objectives, could provide as 
alternative explanation.  
The personal aspect in business relati onships creates a trust and a more open 
dialogue that facilitates an exchange of information on new market opportunities, 
potential customers and competitors, all of which is crucial to advancement in the 
Houston business m arket. Managers with  international experience from  our 
sample were more aware of this difference, and could use their already established 
network to overcom e their lack of  knowledge (Arenius 2005, Crick & Spence 
2005). Not all Norwegian managers were prepared and knowledgeable about these 
cultural differences before entry, but tried their best to cope with this networking 
challenge. One key inform ant claimed that successful Norwegian firms generally 
had managers that were sociable, jovial , nice and positive – a prerequisite to 
succeed with networking. Social capabilit ies and personality traits therefore 
seemed to matter greatly in addition to other capabilities, when recruiting expats. 
Furthermore, expats needed to be patient , persistent, hardworking, and reliable to 
succeed in network building and relationships with potential partners.  
 
Network learning  
The business literature emphasize three types of network learning: partner specific 
learning, transfer of experi ential learning in a relations hip to other relationships, 
and learning to coordinate activities through interaction (Johanson and Valhne  
2003). Some Norwegian com panies with we ll-established business relationships 
with larger companies already established in Houston (large Norwegian MNCs) 
and American companies pre-entry, bene fitted largely from their partne rs’ 
                                                 
11 The IFU arrangement is a strategic grants program aimed at commercial and state 
business. The objective is to contribute to the development of new products and solutions 
that leads to international market success. In 2012, Innovation Norway invests over 300 
million NOK, in new industrial and government research and development contracts (IFU 
/ PRD). More information: http://www.innovasjonnorge.no/Finansiering/IFUOFU/  
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networks. The internationalization pr ocess of these firm s was based on  
unanticipated opportunities th at arose out of their part ner network, which is in 
accord with Johanson and Valhne (2003). These networks typically contributed to 
promote the new “Norwegian co mpany” and gave them access to valuable 
business partners and target m arkets. These firms’ internationalization process in 
Houston was facilitated through partner sp ecific networks while  others without 
local networks faced considerable obs tacles. Our research finding s thereby 
illustrate that close collaboration with business partners in Houston create a  
mutual beneficial relationship with  high comm itment. These business 
relationships also led to resource shar ing, new project ventures and m utual 
promotion of technology and business. Th ese benefits are supported in previous 
studies (Anderson and Witz, 1992; Blankenburg Holm et al., 1999; Johanson and 
Valhne 2003).  
 
Furthermore, companies can over tim e develop the second and the third type of 
learning. Other Norwegian subsidiaries  relied on their Am erican managers’ 
network, which also facilitated the netw ork building process. Crick and Spence 
(2005) emphasize the im portance of hi ring a m anager with international 
experience in the early phase of  the interna tionalization process. The managers’ 
network is emphasized as the most important to overcome the liability of newness 
(Lechner and Dowling 2003). Mangers with international experience can have the 
option to use the three different types of network learning. Additionally, based on 
the three types of learning a fourth one arises. The fourth type of learning is where 
firms learn to build new business networks and connect them  to e ach other 
(Johanson and Valhne 2003). Several m anagers with international experience had 
experienced previous start-ups and could use their experience to benefit from the 
fourth type of network learning. Our fi ndings therefore show  that companies, 
through time, can develop capabilities to benefit from all four types of learning.  
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4.5 Challenges in the start-up of organization 
The formal setup of the company as a legal entity and registration was a 
straightforward process for the companies. The process that followed seemed 
more of a challenge. Most managers experienced the startup process as exhausting 
and challenging. Managers’ often pointed to a lack of local business network and 
to challenges in getting access to potential customers as some of the key barriers 
in the startup process. Informants collectively stated that the startup process 
requires 3-5 years with poor results and turnover combined with a daily struggle 
for survival. In many ways it could appear as if the companies underestimated the 
challenges of starting operations in America as these two HQ managers elaborate:  
«Hvis du skal til Kazakhstan så skjønner alle at dette er veldig annerledes. Skal 
du til Amerika så våger folk å tro at det bare er å ta en drosje, de snakker jo 
engelsk og man innbiller seg at det er veldig likt, og det er det ikke. Det tror jeg 
kanskje er det neste målet å finne ut av – at man må være klar over hvor 
annerledes det er.» 
 - Norwegian Head Quarter Manager (Ref: 1.a) 
«Amerikanere er amerikanere, de er vant til å forholde seg til de de alltid har 
brukt. Og de er ganske konservative. Teknologisk så ligger amerikanerne bak oss 
på den måten at det er grovere, og det er ofte enklere. Så vi har slitt litt med å 
komme inn til de lokale, for vi kunne ikke språket, selv om vi kunne snakke 
engelsk. Skjønne på hvilke arenaer ting blir avgjort, det slet vi veldig med.» 
              -          Norwegian Head Quarter Manager (Ref: 4.a)  
Lack of knowledge seems a common factor to why companies experienced 
challenges in the initial stages of internationalization. With lack of resources and 
limited previous international experience it seems as if the process of suffering 
abroad is one of a trial and error approach. One key informant explained that 
some companies start running before they know the direction. Most SMEs seem 
to base their startup by doing most of the effort themselves. However, informants 
and key informants have argued that it is not necessarily better or more efficient 
for an MNC with virtually unlimited resources. Several large Norwegian 
companies are pointed out as companies that faced great challenges in the 
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international expansion towards the U.S market. To act and behave as an 
international company is stated to be a process that requires a corporate culture 
and a long term base in the foreign market.  
«Jeg skal være forsiktig med å bli for kategorisk, men det er klart at jeg så- en av 
grunnene til at jeg sluttet, var at jeg ikke så selskapet som noen internasjonal 
aktør i det hele tatt. Det var et norsk selskap med norsk forankring, norsk 
teknologi. De forsøkte å ekspandere ved å kjøpe opp bedrifter, og etter hvert 
forsvant innmaten i de bedriftene- og de lyktes aldri… 
- CEO, American Company (ref: 10.k) 
Our findings show that the managers most commonly overestimated their market 
knowledge pre-entry. This may represent a major downfall since this 
overestimation of market knowledge decrease firms’ preparedness for conducting 
business in particular markets in which they wish to enter. This case of 
overestimation leads to a ‘shock effect’ where  managers of entrant firms realize 
their lack of local market knowledge (in accord with Pedersen and Pedersen 
2004). The time it takes for a manager to realize this shock is quite sporadic based 
on firm competencies and industry. According to Pedersen and Petersen (2004) 
explicit, or easily transferable knowledge can only carry a firm so far in new 
markets, but it is the realization of the overestimated   tacit knowledge, or the 
work related practical knowledge, that produce a e shock effect. The 
internationalization process of a firm is usually described by the geographical 
spread of the firms’ international activities while committing individual resources 
to foreign markets. The oil industry, especially after recent events in the gulf, has 
experienced a series of checks and measures to ensure the safety of products and 
more importantly the impact these products have on the environment. Companies 
who seek to operate in markets with rather standardized products do not 
experience such ‘shock effects’ because much of the knowledge can be acquired 
before  market entry, but in industries like the oil sector with refined learning 
processes and extensive product modification in order to comply with rules and 
regulations ‘shock effects’ are prevalent (Pedersen and Pedersen 2004).  
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4.5.1 Differences in organizational culture 
"Kulturforskjellene, måten å gjøre ting på, måten samfunnet er organisert på i 
USA er så dimensjonalt forskjellig fra Norge."  
  - Norwegian Head Quarter Manager (Ref: 1.a) 
Several of the interviewed companies had experienced a kind of cultural shock in 
Houston. One example is the large differences between the Norwegian and 
American organizational cultures, which were emphasized by informants. The 
American organizational culture is characterized by hierarchy, where the 
operations are controlled by top-down management.  More, it seemed that the 
American employees were more used to receive orders instead of taking a 
personal initiative. These two factors are very different compared to the 
Norwegian organizational culture, and can be related to the power distance 
dimension (cf. 2.2.1) 
On the other hand, Norwegian managers expressed that Americans were very easy 
to work with. There are some differences in mentality and work behavior, but still 
it is possible to manage those differences. When sourcing American employees to 
work in Norwegian firms, there is going to be some front-end differences. With 
the hierarchy and formality in U.S. business most American employees expect to 
be told what to do and what tasks to focus on, because they are used to a corporate 
culture that lack an openness with their superiors. This is very different than the 
practices in Norway where a creative atmosphere characterizes business. Several 
managers emphasized that this difference can be simply overcome, and the 
informal atmosphere in Norwegian firms can foster great morale and idea 
generation when applied to subsidiaries in Houston. Several managers have 
expressed that Americans accept the Norwegian model; some Americans even 
enjoy adapting to a more flat structure. The key was to be the aware of the 
differences and to be able to handle them while guiding the employees in the right 
direction. Americans get surprised over how Norwegian companies deal  with 
their employees, in terms of openness, job security and flat structure. These are 
factors that could contribute to a better work environment and in the same time 
enhance employee morale. This is claimed by several managers in this study, 
where one of the key informants states as follows:  
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"Føler du tryggheten så kommer kreativiteten. Du klarer aldri å skremme noen til 
å gjøre en god jobb. Det er det mange som fortsatt forsøker; du klarer aldri å 
skremme noen til å vise mer initiativ. Det eneste måten du får folk til å ta initiativ 
på er å bygge tryggheten."  
  - Key Informant, Houston (Ref: 12.k) 
Still several managers warned against adapting Norwegian work culture in their 
subsidiaries in the United States. It is very important to keep it simple and try to 
combine the two different work cultures to the benefit for the overall company, 
while adapting to the local culture. One informant illustrates this issue:    
"Det er viktig å være åpen for å forstå deres tenkemåter. Ikke komme hit og si at 
slik er det i Norge, slik må vi gjøre det her for slik har vi gjort det i Norge i så 
mange år. Vi må prøve å lytte til dem, kanskje inngå kompromiss og fortelle at 
dette må vi ha inn for det er bare slik det er- kanskje ikke si så mye om Norge- og 
så kan vi prøve å tilrettelegge litt ift hvordan du ønsker å ha det litt. Og så blir det 
en middelvei. Men ikke trø noe over hodet på dem som heter Norge. Det liker de 
ikke."  
-  Norwegian Subsidiary Manager (Ref: 2.b) 
Norwegian companies have to be aware of the cultural differences in order to be 
able to overcome them in the early phase in the internationalization process. The 
easiest way to overcome these obstacles is through preparation. It is important to 
be open-minded to be able to adjust to cultural differences. This can be done 
through research, interaction with other Norwegian companies in the area, and 
professional consultants. Managers remarked that even though they thought the 
Norwegian model of employment was favorable, they only exploited it to a lesser 
extent while being open in accepting American practices. They argued that the 
subsidiary had to use American methods in conducting business, and also towards 
its employees. Liability and legal issues was emphasized as a key reason.     
"One of the things that I remember from the legal perspective, I remember when I 
was applying for a directors and officers insurance here, that was new to 
Norwegian since you don’t need to cover it. It is more, the liability that centered 
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around the US offices really have to do with the employee litigation than anything 
else."  
- Norwegian Subsidiary Manager (Ref: 13.b) 
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4.6 The access to and transfer of knowledge between HQ and 
subsidiary  
 
This section will focus on the access and transfer of knowledge between the HQ 
and the subsidiary. Interviews have been conducted from both headquarter and 
subsidiary perspectives, and will be reflected upon in this section. The focus will 
first focus on the choice between an expat and a local, and their role in knowledge 
transfer. We then analyze how social capital can enhance communication between 
subsidiaries and headquarter. Furthermore we will examine how the Norwegian 
subsea companies experienced the transfer of knowledge.  
 
4.6.1 The choice of expat versus locals and their role in knowledge transfer  
The selection of subsidiary management is an issue where the companies we 
interviewed had different opinions. Some managers swear to select a Norwegian 
manager that has proven trustworthy and knowledgeable through years of 
acquaintance with the company prior to expansion. Headquarter managers argue 
that this person will strengthen the relationship between the two offices and 
facilitate a higher degree of confidence in the subsidiary in the eyes of HQ in 
Norway (in accord with Harzing, 2001). The other view is that subsidiary 
management has to be headed by a local manager in order to utilize local 
networks and relations. Local market knowledge has also been applied in the 
arguments of having a local manager (Mitra & Golder, 2002). Several managers 
state that local employees are needed in order to build a truly local organization.  
The question is not about if the subsidiary should have only Norwegians or 
American employees, but if one should ground the organization in an American 
leader or a Norwegian one.   
 «Du er nødt til å tilpasse deg til det amerikanske samfunnet. Kostnadsnivået også 
tilsier at en Man bør bruke amerikanere så mye en kan.. Men det er klart at det er 
veldig mangfoldig for oss å ha en nordmann som kan dette, fordi det er mye letter 
å kommunisere med en nordmann med norsk verdi bakgrunn.. Det reduserer 
risikoen.” 
‐ Norwegian Head Quarter Manager (Ref: 1.a) 
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There is also a substantial difference among backgrounds of the various 
subsidiary managers we interviewed. Most of the managers had a technological 
orientation, educated as an engineer or a technician. Rarely does the subsidiary 
manager hold a business related education. However, the findings suggest that the 
Americans that were hired had a greater focus on sales activities, marketing, and 
networking, compared to Norwegians. The latter held a greater focus on the 
technological competence, while the Americans are more focused on establishing 
contacts and presenting the company.   
“Han amerikaneren selger på en helt annen måte en oss som nordmenn. For han 
eier ikke skam i livet. Vi er jo mye mer beskjedne. Han bare går bort og snakker 
med noen og du må ha det når du er der borte. Jeg har lite tro på å sende over en 
nordmann som skal sitte i Houston alene og selge. Det har jeg ikke tro på. Ikke 
bra. 
‐ Norwegian Head Quarter Manager (Ref: 3.a) 
The most common view from headquarter management was that they trusted a 
Norwegian subsidiary manager more than a local manager, even if they 
acknowledged the need of a local representative. Additionally, the use of an expat 
will contribute to managerial development and organizational structuring, as 
managers from the host market will gain international experience (Harzing, 2001). 
Of the subsidiaries interviewed only 2 out of 15 had a local American manager. 
One of the two American subsidiary managers argued the following:  
“How do you get the product to the market? Do you give that to a 25 year old kid 
and say; here try it! Or do you hire a guy that has been in that business for a long 
time and knows people and say; here, do you think you can do it? I know I could, 
because I know executives at BP, at Shell at Exxon and some other of these 
companies, who have known me from my time at Baker. I think you get a lot better 
result if you from the beginning- your goal is to have a local organization. I think 
it works better.” 
‐ American Subsidiary Manager (Ref: 9.b)  
The arguments provided by the American manager would be difficult to 
contradict. Still, several Norwegian managers faced many obstacles in using an 
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American manager at the initial stage. They perceived a Norwegian manager to be 
more stable, easy to communicate with and well oriented within the technology 
and expertise of the company. The Norwegian subsidiary managers argued that 
the choice of Norwegian managers was proper and effective as long as the expat 
succeeded to integrate in the local community, respecting the culture and 
accepting the American way. The same managers pointed out that there were 
several societal and cultural conditions they didn’t like in Houston, but explained 
that; there are plenty of things I would change in Norway too. It is a matter of 
acceptance and flexibility. One subsidiary manager claimed; you have to face the 
challenges and wrongs with a smile!  
Additionally, great rotation of American employees, low degree of loyalty and 
low degree of efficiency has been suggested as reasons to why the Norwegian 
headquarter managers prefer Norwegian subsidiary managers.  
”Vi hadde en amerikansk leder fra 2001-2007.  Så fant vi ut at vi fikk ingenting til 
når det gjaldt vekst på akkurat det. Ganske enkelt fordi at kulturforskjellen på 
amerikanerne og det å skulle vite inngangen i organisasjonen her i Norge for å få 
attention og for å få prioritert osv. Selv om vi tok disse to karene til Norge mange 
ganger, og lot de treffe folk og sånn, men det var liksom ikke noe sånn ”klikk 
klikk” så hadde de opprettet forbindelsen. Det fant vi var veldig tungt, så i 2007 
besluttet vi at vi måtte ha en norsk leder der borte. Og det har vi nå” 
‐ Norwegian Head Quarter Manager (Ref: 4.a)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.6.2 The role of social capital 
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To succeed in developing a subsidiary organization, recruit employees, to build a 
business network and so on depended la rgely on the s ocial capital of the 
managers. The concept of social cap ital emphasizes the im portance of 
relationships and networks, and m ore importantly the opportunities and resources 
available from such relationships (cf 2.7.2) . A m anager with great international 
experience and resulting network from past  work can contribute greatly to the 
social capital of the firm  (cf 2.7.2). Agndal (2008) rem arks that firm s realize 
social capital through their ne twork relationships, and that  they acquire mutually 
beneficial resources from these relationships. Subs idiary staffing strategy is a 
crucial resource in which SMEs with an international outreach need to focus on 
for survival in the foreign marketplace. One key issue is staf fing with expatriates, 
with extensive international experience, or using lo cal workers who are 
knowledgeable in the m arket culture and environment. Fang et al. (2010) noted 
the importance of expatriates in the tran sfer of both, their ow n technological and 
managerial expertise, but also the tran sfer of organizational knowledge between 
HQ and subsidiary. Although expats posse ss crucial organi zational knowledge 
they lack the local m arket knowledge, Fang et al. (2010) also notes that using 
local managers enables the firm to better adapt HQ knowledge and processes into 
the target local m arket. High-tech fi rms need the technological support for 
product-related activities, and know how.  Several managers claimed that markets 
in the United States were getting ever more saturated with new technologies to 
less costs, and highlighted need of a local m anager in the future to h andle the 
increased competition. There were two problems that were expressed  throughout 
our interviews, first the recruitm ent process in the United S tates, and second the 
distance from production in Norway. Although  managers is a costly investm ent, 
supporting and funding the subsidiary efficiently in the United States would allow 
for quicker response tim es and the chance  to take advantage of unanticipated 
opportunities. But, not only do subsidiaries need a healthy dose of capital; they 
need an effectiv e workforce, and cl ose contact with HQ, both for em ployee 
morale and transfer of knowledge.  
It is one thing to have a manager with superior competence within one’s own 
home market, but it is truly another if a manager possess prior international 
experience and substantial internal firm specific knowledge. Innovative highly 
specialized firms have the opportunity to jump boarders and exploit opportunities 
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abroad; having a highly dynamic manager who can quickly adapt to unexpected 
market changes can ensure stability for the firm, while utilizing his/her 
international experience and network (Arenius 2005). Lechner and Dowling 
(2003) stress the importance of employing a manager who is internationally 
experienced and connected; such connections will enable the firm to overcome the 
liability of newness. It is a known fact that smaller firms have a higher propensity 
to fall through than older more established firms, especially in foreign markets. 
Young organizations face liability of newness when they have to learn new roles, 
but most importantly their inability in the early stages to compete effectively with 
established firms as well as their low level of legitimacy in foreign markets. Singh 
et al. (1986) explored the external legitimacy and internal coordination with 
respect to organizations overcoming the liability of newness. They found that 
firms with proficient external outreach were more capable in overcoming the 
barriers of legitimacy and competition than firms that were more internally 
coordinated. This strengthens our claim that firms that aim to branch into foreign 
markets need a manager with sufficient international experience and networks.  
The problem that most of our informants highlighted is the doubt that many 
American managers showed towards their products and services, doubt in product 
legitimacy. A competent manager who is well connected can not only adapt the 
subsidiary to new market conditions but also utilize his/her network to enhance 
the credibility and value in their products and services. An established managerial 
business network can also help to reduce the barrier of psychic distance, as the 
network can help overcome cultural specific attributes that might be unknown to 
the entering firm (in accord with ref Agndal et al., 2008; Han, 2006; Arenius, 
2005). We therefore argue that use of local managers or home-country managers 
is a trade-off between acquisitions of local market knowledge and the 
development of the organization as a whole. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.6.3 Experiences with transfer of knowledge 
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"Læring i forhold til kommunikasjon er den viktigste internasjonale læringen"  
‐ Norwegian Head Quarter Manager (Ref: 7.a) 
 
As aforementioned, the transfer of knowledge between business units in MNCs is 
critical to ensure th ese firms’ competitive advantage and s uperior performance 
(Lord & Ranft, 2000). In this research, we emphasize the transfer of three kinds of 
knowledge: organizational values and pr actices, technological, and m arketing 
knowledge. Most firms interview ed acknowledged the value of knowledge 
transfer, and claimed that knowledge transfer contributed to a better understanding 
between the HQ and subsidiary. Firm s especially aware of this issue p re-entry 
demonstrated higher capability to coor dinate the flow of knowledge (in accord 
with Lord & Ranft,2000). In the following, we elaborate on the transfer of 
organizational values and practices, the transfer of  technology, and m arketing 
knowledge.  
 
Transfer of organizational values and practices  
Several of the Norwegian managers emphasized the importance of transferring the 
organizational culture, values and practices from HQ in Ber gen to the s ubsidiary 
in Houston. The strong ties and i nvolvement from HQ m ay function as a 
safeguard to obtain the information flow (Polanyi, 1962). One of the main reasons 
to recruit Norwegian expats to run the s ubsidiary was their ability to un derstand 
the organizational culture in Norway and hence deploy it in the subsidiary. Some  
companies sent American employees to Bergen to learn the organizational culture 
and practices. However, it  can be questioned if em ployees can learn another 
country’s organizational culture during a 3 weeks stay.  
A number of the m anagers also acknowledged the difficulty in transferring these 
values because of large cultural di fferences between the two countries. 
Perceptions of what kind of knowledge transfer that was desired ch anged with 
time. Increased knowledge of the local socio-cultural conditions (in Houston) 
changed initial perceptions of knowledge transfer and use, and gradually favored a 
more locally adapted approach. 
"Det er viktig å være åpen for å forstå deres tenkemåter. Ikke komme hit og si at 
slik er det i Norge, slik må vi gjøre det her for slik har vi gjort det i Norge i så 
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mange år. Vi må prøve å lytte til dem, kanskje inngå kompromiss og fortelle at 
dette må vi ha inn for det er bare slik det er - kanskje ikke si så mye om Norge - 
og så kan vi prøve å tilrettelegge litt ift hvordan du ønsker å ha det litt. Og så blir 
det en middelvei. Men ikke trø noe over hodet på dem som heter Norge. Det liker 
de ikke."  
‐ Norwegian Subsidiary Manager (Ref: 2.b) 
 
 
Transfer of technological knowledge  
Technological knowledge refers to knowledge regarding the products 
(technology). Typically, subsidiaries re ly heavily on tech nological knowledge 
developed in the home country of their pare nt firms, and because of its value and 
rarity, technological knowledge provides a firm  with strategic advantages in 
international expansion (Fang et al. 2010) . A m ajority of m anagers at both HQ 
and the subsidiary emphasized that this kind of knowledge is the m ost frequently 
transferred.  
"90 per cent would be technical, and it is directed to the computer program and 
how you handle that one."  
‐ Norwegian Subsidiary Manager (Ref: 13.b) 
 
As nearly all parent–firm s develop and produce the technology in Norway (at 
HQs), it is essential that know ledge is transferred to the subsidiaries. This can be 
done through training of subsidiary employees in Norway or Houston and through 
different forms of communication. On the other hand, managers in the subsidiaries 
were conscious of the m arket differences and the need to adapt technology and 
products.  
"(…) then it comes up a lots of ideas, which comes from the meetings with our 
clients here which has different types of problems and your ideas about solving 
them back home. And we have to bring them back home."  
‐ Norwegian Subsidiary Manager (Ref: 13.b) 
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This exchange of knowledge contri butes to better an d more harmonious 
understanding (in HQ and subsidiaries) of the different markets: the North Sea 
and Gulf of Mexico, and was deem ed necessary to achieve m arket success in 
Houston. As aforem entioned, even well-es tablished technological advancements 
from Norway had to be adapted, tested a nd verified to f it the Gulf of Mexico 
market. Subsidiary managers with expe rience based knowledge of operations in 
the Gulf of Mexico, and with close cont act with cus tomers had th e ability to  
suggest adaptations of the technology to local market needs.  
 
Transfer of marketing knowledge  
Marketing knowledge is a crucia l asset f or firms, and contribu tes with tim e to 
brand building. Yet, although a brands’ value is transferable to new products and 
technologies, its transfer to  a foreign subsidiary could be difficult because of the 
high location specificity of  marketing knowledge (Fang et al 2010). S ubsidiary 
managers experienced challenges to m arket and to sell the paren t-firm’s 
technology in Houston. Cultural distan ce between Norway and the U SA and 
differences in the local industry culture and market needs were major explanations 
for this. Reputations ob tained in Norway are not always transferable to the new 
business environment. Managers also unde rstood that they had to build local 
business networks and engage in social izing to acquire local m arket knowledge 
and to gain new customers – a different exercise compared to business in Norway. 
Hence, marketing knowledge obtained in the home market did not seem to fit the 
host market. To be ab le to adapt to loc al market conditions, the  subsidiary 
managers had to be knowledgeable of th e host country’s political, econom ic, and 
socio-cultural institutions and prac tices. Hiring local m anagers (Americans) in 
subsidiaries could make the adaptation of marketing knowledge easier and faster, 
as they already possess the necessary local market knowledge. Their profound 
knowledge of the host-country m arket enabled them to identify application 
opportunities as well as m isfits associated with the parent-firm s marketing 
knowledge. In the case of Norwegian su bsidiary managers, it seem ed that 
acquiring the local m arket knowledge wa s experience-based and a long-term 
affair:  
"Vi lærer hver dag hvordan markedet fungerer. Tror jeg har vært her nå i 22 år, 
men hvert marked har sin (…) jeg har vært innenfor mange typer markeder 
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innenfor olje og gass og shipping, hvert marked har sine modeller, ingen tvil om 
det."  
‐ Norwegian Subsidiary Manager (Ref: 1.b.2) 
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5 Discussion and Conclusion  
 
This case study has revealed some specific issues related to the 
internationalization process of SMEs from a Norwegian oil & gas cluster. Overall, 
the companies stated that they were committed to Houston and the international 
establishment. The average years for SMEs established in Houston was 4,3 years 
for the specific sample12. We can therefore argue that the firms from the sample 
still is in its early phase of establishment. However, a surprising amount of the 
firms suffered from lack of plans and strategies prior to establishment. 
Underestimation of the cultural differences and a tremendous faith in their 
Norwegian products should be perceived as two important factors to why the 
decision makers initiated the establishment without any detailed plans or 
strategies. Costs related to operations of the subsidiary and the expenses of expats 
are proven to be significant. The key informants and some managers argued that 
thorough plans and strategies pre-entry could function as an efficient method of 
cost reduction. Key informants also elaborated that more activities and workload 
related to the subsidiary start-up could have been performed prior to entry.  
 
Due to the fact that SMEs hold high-tech products and great competency, most 
firms chose a wholly owned greenfield as an establishment mode. This is in 
accordance with the literature, as e.g. a joint venture would increase the risk of 
competitive knowledge to be leaked. Thus managers should be aware that without 
any local partners, the access to local market specific information is more 
challenging. The managers’ response was to focus on the increasing importance of 
the local business network. The value and importance of business networks was 
clearly critical in the U.S market. Even though business networks naturally are of 
importance in Norway, the social aspect of networks was stated to be more critical 
in America. The research did not achieve to reveal if the Norwegian managers 
failed or succeed regarding formation and care of the business networks, yet a 
number of the managers argued that they were surprised by the increased 
importance of the personal and business networks. Due to these cultural 
                                                 
12 Excluding key informants and facilitators  
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differences, Norwegian managers should be trained prior to the foreign activities 
so they better understand the importance of networks, and how these may be 
assembled and kept. On the other hand, managers with prior international 
experiences was much more open minded towards these differences and seemed 
more prepared to identify and react upon these local behavioral tendencies.   
 
Most firms still had difficulties in reaching sufficient financial performance and 
sales. Yet, managers at the headquarters of Norway and subsidiaries in Houston 
stated their commitment to the market and their further efforts. This is in 
compliance with the literature, which states that the internationalization process 
should be strategically, and imminent demands to profits should not be a 
requirement or decisive. Also most managers perceived Houston to be the most 
important energy hub of the world. The perception was that “you are almost 
expected to be here”. Motives as access to information, knowledge of global 
market demands and closeness to decision makers toward critical industry leaders 
was also emphasized. However, several of the key informants demonstrated some 
uncertainty to the future importance of Houston as a hub. Requirements toward 
local content in emerging nations within Africa and in Brazil were used as 
examples to why the future position of Houston should be perceived questionable. 
Norwegian managers also supported this statement as they argued that future 
investments and initiatives would occur in countries such as Brazil. Norwegian 
managers therefore have to be careful to decide to establish operations in Houston 
mainly because “most others are doing it”.  
 
The SMEs were highly focused on their technology know-how and focused on 
establishing their competitive advantage through their high-tech products. The 
motive for internationalization was to reach new markets for their existing 
products. Some, however, realized that the market inequalities led to difficulties 
with product standardization and were compelled to adapt to the American 
market. It should been emphasized that it seems as the Norwegian small firms 
have exaggerated faith in their Norwegian developed products. It seems as some 
managers believe that due to great success in Norway, the introduction of the 
product in the American market will reach success almost automatically. More 
than a few of the managers showed great pride of the technology development in 
Norway and the related knowledge and competence. Yet, we would argue that the 
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Norwegian managers fail to understand if the demand for these state- of the art 
products actually exists in America. Managers did acknowledge that Americans 
found their products to be exciting, but at a far too high cost and sophistication. 
Norwegian managers should be aware of the importance of thorough market 
analysis and discussions of demand and needs prior to the decision of 
establishment.  
 
An important finding is related to the time needed for the sales decision to be 
made. Norwegian managers stated that even though American firm showed 
interest and stated their willingness to purchase the product, there was still a long 
way to the actual purchase. Due to cultural variables and liability, the firm has to 
conduct a great process of supplier approval, certification and documentation of 
both the firm and the product. Most American decision makers are risk averse and 
would avoid any products that not have proved its reliability and performance 
through a number of previous operations. American decision makers showed 
skepticism toward how long the firm or the management would be present in 
Houston before they returned home. Norwegian managers often was replied to by 
Americans by; “how long are you going to be here before you return home?”. 
Promotion of commitment and long-term orientation should be perceived as 
critical for Norwegian managers in building trust with the American purchasers. 
The Norwegian firms had problems to convince this commitment also due to the 
fact that they rarely had engineers and R&D department in their foreign 
establishment. If customers would have conversations with skilled personnel, they 
had to perform this through email or by phone. Due to the great time difference- 
this was hard to implement without thorough planning. This was emphasized as a 
great challenge for the Norwegian SMEs. At the same time several of the 
subsidiary managers argued that the initial decision of production and 
development had proved wrong. Most of the firms established production in the 
foreign unit, while development and engineering was kept home in Norway. The 
initial motive was due to the perception of cheap production and labor cost in 
America. This perception turned wrong. It was true that labor cost was cheaper, 
yet efficiency was evenly lower. Production in Norway can most definitely 
compete with production in the U.S due to efficiency, know-how and precision. 
Some managers also argued that the decision of not having engineering in the 
foreign establishment resulted in poor performance. The requirement of 
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adaptation and the customers need for interaction led to the need for employees 
with the specialized knowledge. Mangers agreed that there is a need for a critical 
minimum mass of employees, meaning that the foreign unit has to hold a certain 
set of employees and competence, if it should be able to meet the requirements of 
the markets. This would increase the trust of the customer and enable the 
subsidiary to adapt to the demarcated of the local needs.   
 
The firms seemed to transfer technology and knowledge in a sufficient level. Still, 
few firms had proper routines for rotation of human capital. Just in a few of the 
firms, the employees rotated between the subsidiary and headquarters to secure 
strong internal ties and transfer of knowledge. Most subsidiaries were constructed 
as sales offices and did not have an extended strategic role, except for sales and 
access to market information. At the managerial level, the firms had routines for 
visits between the different offices. Especially subsidiary managers stated that the 
effect of visits from the home office was of great value. However, several of the 
key informants warned firms not to heavily marketing Norway, meaning that it 
was far more effective to position the subsidiary as American without putting too 
much focus in creating a Norwegian profile in the American market.  
 
Some of the challenges and the organizational dimensions discussed are 
applicable for all of the firms, while other dimensions are more specific for each 
firm. It will never be possible to list a complete picture of all the “to do” and 
“wrongs” for all the firms. However, most of the issues discussed are based in the 
actual awareness of these issues. A general finding was that the experienced 
managers were more aware of the issues, than what the more inexperienced was. 
Most managers had limited background within business. Several of the managers 
was highly specialized engineers, or with other technological experience. Often 
they were situated in the managerial position due to sufficient organizational 
capabilities. Managerial training or education within international management 
was not a subject in any of the SMEs. The firm solely relied on the experiences 
and the capabilities the manager possessed prior to entry. This situation may be 
used as an argument that SMEs underestimate the challenges of 
internationalization toward the U.S market or that they are not aware of the 
critical issues toward establishing a subsidiary in a foreign market. This could 
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reduce the situation were most of the managers stated that they had performed 
costly errors and mistake. 
 
A final remark must be done toward the facilitators of international business. 
Three organizations were emphasized by the managers as important for 
Norwegian SMEs in Houston. Firstly The Norwegian Seamen’s Church was 
argued to be important for the family of the expat and also for networking among 
the Norwegian companies. Most managers visited the church each Saturday to 
discuss business specific issues with other managers. This was stated to be a great 
arena for exchange of information and contacts. Secondly, Intsok was highlighted 
as an important facilitator to reach market info and to facilitate useful seminars 
and conferences. The events of Intsok made it possible to meet with potential 
customers and exchange important information of networks and market 
tendencies. Finally, Innovation Norway Houston (INH) was stated to be a 
valuable partner for many of the firms. If the company is within a certain set of 
conditions, they may receive monetary support from INH. In addition Innovation 
Norway holds an extended network of trustworthy lawyers, consultants, advisors 
and administrative personnel which the SMEs may enjoy form. More, INH holds 
offices for very small Norwegian firms for rental in the imminent phase of 
establishment. Most managers and key informants stated that all Norwegian 
SMEs would enjoy great benefits of the access to knowledge, network and advice 
that is held by Innovation Norway in Houston. A few of the managers even stated 
that their establishment in Houston would not be possible without the support of 
INH. Naturally, the managers of the SMEs indeed have to do all the hard work 
themselves, yet INH may be a highly valuable partner to hold hands in the 
imminent phase of establishment.    
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Abstract  
This master thesis is part of the research project titled: “Local cluster going 
international: balancing local and non-local networking”. The Research Council 
GRA 19003 – Master Thesis     01.09.2012  
Page 82 
of Norway and the clusters: NCE Subsea13 and NCE Maritime finance the 
project:. The research problems in this thesis have to match with the overall 
research problems in the larger project, and are developed through collaboration 
with the research project leader. One major research objective is to investigate the 
internationalization processes of firms from the two regional clusters: NCE 
Subsea and NCE Maritime. In our master thesis, we concentrate on market entry 
processes of firms in the subsea cluster in Bergen, with a focus on market entry to 
Houston, USA. We are also interested in the relations between headquarters (in 
Bergen) and the subsidiary (in Houston) with a focus on knowledge transfer both 
ways. 
  
In spring 2011, we conducted in-depth interviews with seven top managers of 
different firms in Bergen with a head quarter (HQ) perspective14. In these 
interviews, we concentrated upon four main topics. We were interested in the 
decision-making process prior to the market entry, investigate how the 
management assessed the necessary resources and on the preparation for the 
process. Second, we focused on the learning process after establishment, i.e. what 
kind of adjustments they  implemented, and what kind of challenges that emerged. 
Third, we focused on the relationship between the HQ and the subsidiary with an 
emphasis on the transfer of knowledge and learning. Lastly, we focused on the 
process of establishment with a  retrospective approach. In this part,we examined 
how successful they perceived their own process and what they would have done 
differently.  
  
The future prospect is to conduct additional interviews in Bergen and Houston to 
accomplish the data-collection phase. There have been established a relationship 
with Innovasjon Norge in Houston. The representative from Innovasjon Norge is 
positive to assist our research: to contact and select relevant subsidiaries, and to be 
a key informant in our study.  
 
                                                 
13 The Norwegian Centres of Expertise Program (NCE) is established to enhance sustainable 
innovation and internationalization processes in the most dynamic and growth-oriented Norwegian 
clusters. The program supports long-term development processes in the clusters based on 
collaboration between industry, R&D and the public sector. Twelve clusters have so far been 
selected and given status as a NCE project. (nce.no) 
14 In addition, we interviewed two managers with experience from subsidiaries in Houston, to get 
the perspective from the subsidiary.   
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We have already completed some of the objectives for this thesis to date. The 
interview guide for Bergen and Houston is accomplished, we have finished almost 
all interviews in Bergen, and we are in the initial stage of making appointments 
with subsidiaries in Houston. However, we experienced that some key informants 
had problems in giving clear answers to some of our questions. Most of the 
managers participating had a technically oriented background and perhaps had not 
reflected on some of the issues presented. We have to revise the transcripts and 
find out which questions were poorly answered, to find questions that are more 
proper. We should also consider giving extended background information for each 
topic so that the key informant better understands what kind of elaborations we are 
looking for.   
 
Field of Study 
This master thesis focuses on Norwegian SMEs in the subsea cluster in the region 
of Bergen. The cluster is perceived as an international leading center of expertise 
in operations, maintenance, surveillance, modifications and upgrades of subsea 
installations (NCE memo, 2009). There are approximately 160 member 
companies with a total annual turnover of 11.6 billion Norwegian kroner, 
representing a workforce around 4000 employees (Jakobsen & Fløysand, 2011). 
These firms deliver high-tech solutions to offshore oil and gas production 
domestically and internationally. 
 
In late 2006, the cluster was approved as a Norwegian Centre of Expertise (NCE) 
due to its international and domestic growth potential and its national importance 
substantial impact of the Norwegian industry. There are some large multinational 
companies in the cluster, but the SMEs are also important members. These 
smaller firms are important subcontractors for the bigger firms in the subsea 
cluster around Bergen.  
 
Our master thesis’ research objective is to investigate the market entry processes 
of SMEs from the subsea cluster. The common feature to the participating 
companies in our study is that they all have a subsidiary located in Houston. The 
paper will investigate the different approaches to internationalization chosen by 
the different firms. We will reveal the different valuable resources in this process 
and how they conduct their decision-making process. Comparing the different 
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firms can reveal important factors in the process of internationalization by a SME. 
At the same time, we adopt a dyadic approach by interviewing both HQ and 
subsidiaries. This approach enables us to obtain perceptions of the same topics 
from both sides of the dyad. This dyadic approach can increase the validity of our 
research, and will provide us with useful knowledge about the relationship 
between the subsidiary and the HQ.  
 
This research is based on existing literature within the field of internationalization 
processes, foreign market entry processes, market entry modes and knowledge 
sharing and transfer in SMEs.  
 
Literature Review  
This part will present the literature of theories that try to explain the 
internationalization process. The focus will be on literature that explains decisions 
made prior, during and after the establishment of subsidiary abroad. Furthermore, 
we will combine the different literatures to provide a framework for empirical 
investigation. In addition, we will revise this literature review according to the 
information gained from the interviews, later in the master thesis process.    
 
Small and Medium sized Enterprises  
The SME is defined as a firm with 500 or fewer employees (Cavusgil, 2008). 
Certainly, this is an American perspective, where companies in general are bigger 
than in Norway. However, the competitive advantages of an SME are typically 
their innovative and adaptive capabilities. They often target market niches that 
MNE‘s perceive too small to focus on. Mostly they adapt their products and 
marketing to special customer needs. Moreover, SMEs are usually more flexible 
and faster to respond to local market needs than MNEs (Cavusgil, 2008). 
However, they are often constrained by limited resources that prevent them from 
international expansion. That is why they leverage the service and the expertise of 
intermediaries and facilitators to succeed abroad 
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The internationalization process: 
 
In the literature of the internationalization process, many theories try to explain 
factors taken in consideration when establishing a subsidiary abroad. The Uppsala 
Model emphasizes that the lack of knowledge about foreign markets creates an 
uncertainty and is a great obstacle to the firms’ internationalization process. 
Market knowledge can be gained through operations abroad (Johanson & Vahlne, 
1977). This model focuses on how the internationalization of firms begins in close 
markets that are similar in terms of psychic distance. The term psychic distance, is 
defined by Johanson & Vahlne (1977) as “sum of the factors preventing the flow 
of information from and to the market”. Examples of factors related to psychic 
distance are differences in language, education, business practices, culture and 
industrial development. In other words, the firms will start internationalizing in 
geographically close countries through incremental learning and then start to 
internationalize into markets further away. Incremental learning is defined as 
gradually learning through “learning by doing”, where you enter similar countries 
and then use the acquired knowledge to move to more distant markets (Johanson 
& Vahlne 1977).  
 
The Uppsala Model, has in the last 20 years, been challenged by firms that have 
internationalized early on in their business life cycle. Traditionally, companies 
tested their technology in the domestic or in close markets, whereas today,  a large 
number of  companies test their technologies in distant markets in an early phase. 
Forsgren (2002) argues in his article that the concept of learning in the Uppsala 
Model is too narrow, which in turn limits the models ability to explain and predict 
the internationalization behavior precisely.  
 
Many researchers due to the global competition and the accelerating technological 
development that force firms to internationalize more rapidly than some decades 
ago have emphasized this observation (Johanson & Vahlne, 2003). The Uppsala 
Model was based on Swedish multinational enterprises (MNE) that started to 
internationalize to similar countries and then moved further away and experienced 
incremental learning. In our sample of SMEs from the subsea cluster, there are 
both early and late internationalizing firms, hence both the Uppsala model and the 
born global theory seem relevant to consider in our study.  In this section, we 
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review literature on the internationalization pattern of high-tech SME, and reveal 
the differences in their internationalization process compared to the Uppsala 
Model.   
 
In this paper, we divide the internationalization process in three stages: (1) 
strategic pre-entry internationalization process, (2) internationalization process 
and strategies (3) local and global networks. The selection of foreign market is 
defined as the moment considering internationalizing to actually selecting a 
foreign market. This includes the reason to internationalize and why selecting that 
specific market. The second stage will focus on the strategies used to overcome 
the psychic distance and the use of networks. Here we seek to determine which 
factors influenced to choose the specific mode of entry. Then in the end we will 
analyze the importance of networks and the transfer of knowledge between 
headquarter (HQ) and subsidiary.  
 
(1) Selection of foreign market: 
 
Network perspective: the importance of different relations.  
“The old models of incremental learning are no longer valid” - Johanson and 
Vahlne (2003).  
 
The Uppsala Model predicts that firms start to internationalize according to 
psychic distance (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990). However, research shows 
that technology-based firms were more influenced in their choice of market 
selection by domestic client followership, sectorial targeting, and industry trends 
(Bell 1995; Arenius 2005). High tech firms are dependent on internationalizing 
more rapidly due to the global competition and the high growth of technological 
development than some decades ago (Johanson and Vahlne 2003).  
 
Firms that do not follow one specific path when internationalizing, illustrate this 
new trend.  The Norwegian subsea companies fall into the categorization as  
technology-based firms. This research seeks to investigate if the market selection 
was influenced by domestic client followership, sectorial targeting and industry 
trends. Another interesting factor is the influence of the growth technological 
development and if that influenced firms to internationalize to Houston.    
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The dynamic environment has forced companies to be more innovative- due to the 
increased competition to survive. Still, many firms successfully penetrate markets 
rapidly and manage to overcome the psychic distance. This is something that is 
illustrated by the subsea companies. Arenius (2005) argues that firms are able to 
overcome psychic distance by gaining direct experiential knowledge through their 
networks. Axelsson and Easton (1992) define network as “sets of two or more 
connected exchange relationships”. While business networks are defined as sets of 
interconnected business relationships, in which each exchange relation is between 
businesses firms conceptualized as collective actors (Anderson et al., 1994; 
Johanson and Vahlne 2003). As the Norwegian subsea companies have 
internationalized to markets further away, we seek to reveal the impact of existing 
network of the firms, with focus on networks from the subsea cluster.     
 
Social Capital 
SMEs in the early stage of the internationalization process often lack resources 
(Chetty & Cambell – Hunt, 2003). These firms will often lack financial funds, 
knowledge about foreign market and international contacts. They need to be 
innovative in the internationalization process and focus on their existing 
relationship with other firms to identify and exploit specific business opportunities 
(Agndal et al., 2008). Another way to internationalize when the resources are 
limited is to rely on founders, owners and managerial experience.   
 
Internationalization research literature emphasizes the importance of experience in 
the management. This is also confirmed by Crick and Jones (2000) who revealed 
that many companies make their market-selection decision based on the previous 
international experience of the manager.  This experience could be international 
working experience, experience in living abroad and other international 
experience, which will decrease the perceived psychic distance (Madsen and 
Servais, 1997; McDougall et al., 1994; Arenius, 2005). This can indicate that 
network, or so called Social Capital, is more important than what the Uppsala 
model predicted. Social Capital is defined by Nahapiet and Goshal (1998, p.243) 
as “the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, available 
through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed by an individual 
or social unit […] social capital comprises both the network and the assets that 
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may mobilized through the network”. In other words, Social Capital is a firm’s 
network of relationship and the resources that can be acquired from the network, 
and consider both actual and potential network (Agndal 2008). Furthermore, it 
will be essential to investigate the experience of the founders, owners and 
managers to reveal the impact of their social capital for the internationalization 
process.   
 
Relationship commitment and learning 
Many firms internationalize based on unpredicted opportunities that arises from 
their network. Firms are dependent on relationships that develop gradually 
through interaction between each other, which in turn will lead to higher 
commitment to the relationship (Johanson and Valhne 2003; Anderson and Witz, 
1992; Blankenburg Holm et al., 1999). Internationalization is according to the 
process view a process of increasing commitments to foreign operations. The 
greater, the more specific, and the more integrated with other firm activities in 
those market are, the stronger is the firm’s dependence on them (Johanson and 
Valhne 2003). This is emphasized by Johanson and Valhne (2003) when they 
state that the earlier experience and commitments will influence where the first 
market entry will occur. The impact of relationship and commitment will be 
investigated to reveal their importance on Norwegian subsea companies decision 
processes.   
We will further on take a look at literature which try to explain firms’ 
international expansion, and try to develop an understanding of how firms 
overcome market uncertainty, psychic distance and lack of market knowledge.  
 
Internationalization process and strategies: 
 
Forsgreen (2002) argues in his review of the Uppsala process of 
internationalization that learning is acquired through other means than only 
through learning by doing. The concept of incremental learning is resource and 
time demanding and requires competence, which may be missing in a firm in the 
beginning of the internationalization process. Three types of learning get 
attention; learning through imitation, acquisition or proactive market research 
(Forsgreen 2002). The first opportunity is to imitate other companies, where the 
firms still have a level uncertainty and decide to follow or copy the actions of 
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other firms. Another opportunity is to increase the speed in the 
internationalization process by acquiring local companies or personnel that 
possess the necessary market knowledge. This point is the opposite of the Uppsala 
model that emphasizes the importance of incremental learning. The third option is 
market research through networks, alliances or surveys. This market research 
could provide the firm with general information, but which also could be useful to 
get insight in the market (Forsgreen 2002). Here, this research seeks to investigate 
the role of the three types of learning and their role to overcome the lack of 
incremental learning.     
 
The internationalization process of a Born Global  
Since the 1970s and 1980s, a new type of firm has emerged. With limited 
resources and lack of knowledge, these firms internationalized rapidly from 
inception. The liberalization of the economy and the increased globalization 
should be considered as the driver for the emergence of born global firms (Tamar, 
2004). The phenomenon of born globals cannot be explained by the Uppsala 
model and indicates a clear gap within the previous fields of research.  
This type of internationalizing strategy was in the beginning named leapfrogging 
(Hedlund & Kverneland, 1985), Innate exporters (Ganitsky, 1989) and High 
Technology Start-Ups (Jolly et al., 1992). In 1993, McKinsey defined these types 
of firms as Born Globals. McKinsey defined Born Global working with an 
Australian study, as firms that began exporting, on average, only two years after 
their foundation and achieved 76 percent of their total sales through exports 
(Rennie, Michael W. 1993). These firms did not follow the traditional 
internationalizing strategies, where the primary focus of their activities remained 
at the home market, but rather started to internationalize from inception. Born 
Global is defined as: “a business organization that, from inception, seeks to 
derive significant competitive advantage from the use of resources and the sale of 
output in multiple countries” (Oviatt, 1994:5). 
 
McKinsey’s definition includes that a firm should be exporting two years after 
foundation to be categorized as Born Global (Rennie, Michael W. 1993). This 
excludes firms that started to export later than two years, but that experienced the 
same internationalization process as a Born Global. Therefore we choose to focus 
on the definition by Gabrielsson et al. (2008) define a born global firm as one 
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having products with global market potential. The firm can combine this potential 
with an entrepreneurial capability to seek methods of accelerated 
internationalization. The reason for choosing this definition is because we feel this 
grasp the concept in a precise and relevant matter, and without being too technical 
as e.g. McKinsey’s proposed definition.  Further a born global is often perceived 
as a small technology-oriented firm operating in international markets. The 
foreign markets they enter are often with high psychic distance. Simultaneously it 
is interesting that the firms often initiate their market entries without high degree 
of market knowledge or cultural understanding.    
 
Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge the different factors emphasized by 
researchers to be the reason for the rapid market penetration of Born Globals, 
where focus has been on managerial experience and vision (Arenius 2005; 
Gabrielsson et al. 2008). Arenius (2005) defined the speed of market penetration 
as “the time needed from market entry until the generation of sales income from 
that market”. Managers with international experience will increase the market 
penetration and help the firm to overcome their lack of knowledge through their 
network (Arenius 2005, Crick & Spence 2005). This is also confirmed by Crick 
and Spence (2005) where they emphasize that a firms internationalization in an 
early phase need recruitment of an executive with the required experience. 
Gabrielsson et al. (2008) believe that the founder and its global vision at inception 
are the key factors contributing to the success of the Born Global.  
 
With the mentioned findings, we would now like to reveal previous research of 
the market entry process of born globals. A survey of UK high-tech companies 
revealed that the entry mode decision of young, resource-constrained firm is a 
trade-off between the resources available and the support requirements of the 
customers (Burgel & Murray, 2000). The firms often use direct export or 
intermediaries in their entry mode because these are not resource intensive modes. 
One important factor in the choice of entry mode was found to be the level of 
customization required. In case of high customization, the firm often found 
intermediaries to be of less value. Product complexity and need for customer 
interaction could also affect the choice between direct and indirect export. While 
direct export let the firm have control over their know-how and operations, they 
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suffer of being alone. With use of intermediaries or allying with a partner, the 
born global gain access to a network and the experience of the partner.  
 
The survey of Burgel and Murray (2000) find the entry decision to be a function 
of firm-specific, product specific, and target country specific factors. With regards 
to target country, it is found that most born globals enter countries with high 
psychic distance. This entry decision is not in accordance with Uppsala, because it 
implies that other factors must be regarded as more important for the firm, than 
psychic distance.  In fact, the survey found that strategic exploitation is of greater 
importance in the entry decision (Burgel & Murray, 2000). It is believed that the 
specifications of the country these firms enter are of greater importance than the 
distance. Further, the strategic exploitation is found to be more important, in the 
entry mode decision, than psychic distance. In other words, the exploitation of the 
commercial value in the technological competency is of high importance to insure 
their survival.  These factors are of importance when revealing the reason high 
tech firms do not follow the Uppsala model.  
 
The level of previous international experience of managers had high effect on the 
firm’s ability to conduct direct sales to foreign customers. However, this was 
more regarding network development than knowledge orientation. Burgel and 
Murray (2000) argue that the exploitation of already established networks let 
managers evolve into strong personal network and therefore limits the need of 
market knowledge through own experiences. Experiential learning, the key 
variable of the Uppsala internationalization process, is therefore concluded to be 
of less value as an explanation variable for these young, high-tech firms in the 
internationalization decisions (Burgel & Murray, 2000). 
 
We argue that research indicates that the perspective of organizational capability 
of the firm is a better way to reveal how these young firms conduct their entry 
decisions. In this regard, both ends of the value chain should be approached 
simultaneously (Freeman, Edwards, & Schroder, 2006). An advantage of 
approaching the supplier side of the chain is the loyalty and trust created by a 
stable relationship. A strong relationship with the supplier would lead to 
flexibility and mutual benefits of market shares. Customer requirements of large 
volume or customized quality would be easier to comply with support by the 
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suppliers. A formal relationship turns personal over time. Freeman et al. (2006) 
argue that a personal relationship with strong ties leads to a higher exchange of 
knowledge. Further on Freeman et al. (2006) state that the actors in such a 
relationship also help to point out large foreign customers.  
 
Collaborative partnerships with foreign customers and suppliers and use of 
personal networks are two out of five strategies presented by Freeman et al. 
(2006). Use of advanced technology, client followership and multiple modes of 
entry are also useful strategies for a small firm according to Freeman et al. (2006). 
They argue that these strategies should be advantageous to overcome constraints 
in the internationalization process and lead to early and rapid foreign market 
entry.   
 
Operation Mode:  
In this section, we discuss factors that are important in the decision of operation 
mode. One perspective is to reveal which strategic reason the firms have to enter 
the foreign market (Tseng, 2007). There are two main motives to enter a foreign 
market according to Tseng (2007). Either choosing an asset-seeking motive where 
we seek to find country specific advantages of technological resources, market 
relevance or natural resources. The second motive is to exploit firm specific 
advantages in a foreign market. These advantages are defined as either 
technological capabilities, marketing capabilities and firm size.  
 
Tseng (2007) states that a joint venture mode should be considered if the motives 
are asset seeking. The reason is that a partner from the foreign market would bring 
access to resources that are costly or prohibited to reproduce or transferred outside 
of the firm that controls the resources. Especially local market knowledge is 
perceived to be gained rapidly in a joint venture with a local partner. Also, if the 
firm-specific assets are difficult to redeploy overseas, then the joint venture 
should be considered as the most appropriate option for an FDI.  A wholly-owned 
subsidiary should be considered if the firm possesses resources such as specific 
know-how or unique technology that should not be leaked to other actors. This is 
the most efficient mode to exploit competitive advantages without the risk of 
diluting their know-how. However, additional perspectives need to be considered 
in the operation mode decision.  
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A different, resource based view of the firm considers the effect of the domestic 
environment. As retrieved, SMEs suffer from limited resources and the entry 
mode decision could be seen as a trade-off between focus in home market and 
foreign market (Rasheed, 2005). An equity mode of foreign operations, such as 
wholly owned subsidiary, would require substantial financial and human 
resources. By this, the transfer of resources to the foreign market would decrease 
the emphasis of activities and development in the domestic market. Rasheed 
(2005) finds that the environmental factors should be taken into consideration in 
the decision of the entry mode strategy. The results indicate that SMEs can 
experience a higher market performance through exporting (non-equity mode) if 
the domestic industrial growth are high.  
 
 (3) Local and global networks: 
 
Managerial experience  
Another factor is the importance of a manager with international experience to 
penetrate the market rapidly. Managers with experience can provide a company 
with networks, the necessary experience to contemplate between different 
opportunities and the experience to make the fundament for future prospect. 
Arenius (2005) stress the importance of a manager with international experience 
as they can “… take advantage of their international experience and target distant 
markets immediately”. The importance of managers’ or founders’ network is also 
emphasized by Lechner and Dowling (2003), where they mention managers’ 
network as the most important to overcome the liability of newness. In 
internationalization processes, there are certain events that cannot be planned, and 
where it is more important to be able to adapt and act dynamic.  The importance 
of requirement of an executive that has the experience and contacts of a network 
illustrates this (Crick and Spence 2005). Furthermore, this research will reveal the 
importance of using existing network in the early phase of internationalization and 
how these networks decrease psychic distance. Managerial resources with 
international experience can contribute to enable firms to prepare for international 
development and target growth markets (Crick and Spence 2005).  
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Managers tend to overestimate their perceived familiarity with local markets when 
entering a new market. This is confirmed by Pedersen and Pedersen (2004) who 
reveal that managers relies too much on the information they get through network, 
where they overestimate their knowledge of foreign markets before entering. In 
other words, managers tend to believe to have knowledge about the foreign 
market before entry, whereas they realize their lack of knowledge and experience 
a shock effect in the first eight years from establishing presence in the market. The 
shock effect is only valid for tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge, and is at the 
largest in close distant markets and lower in high distant markets (Pedersen and 
Pedersen 2004).  
  
Network learning 
There are three types of business network learning (Johanson and Valhne 2003; 
Håkansson and Johansson, 2001; Pahlberg, 2001). The first type of learning is 
partner specific, which is an outcome of interaction between firms. Where the 
firms learn about each other, such as how the partner adapts to different 
circumstances or the roles of different individuals. This type of learning will 
contribute to higher commitment to the relationship.  Furthermore, the second 
type of learning is when companies learn something from a relationship that can 
be transferred to and used in other relationships. Examples of this could be 
information on how to create new connections, and how to develop different 
relationship. The third type of learning is to know how to coordinate activities 
through interaction. This could concern for instance supplier relationships, and 
issues such as on time deliveries. Based on the three a fourth one arises, where 
firms learn to build new business networks and connect them to each other 
(Johanson and Valhne 2003). Network and relationship building is time and 
resource demanding, and therefore the internationalization will be based on the 
managers existing network. Johanson and Valhne (2003) confirms this when they 
state that the earlier experience and commitments will influence where the first 
market entry will occur. 
 
Access and transfer of market knowledge: 
One of the major concerns in the internationalization process is the access to 
market knowledge. Market knowledge is usually divided into explicit and tacit. 
Explicit knowledge is regarded as demographic data, macroeconomic statistics 
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and other identifiable market measures. Tacit knowledge on the other hand is the 
opposite of explicit knowledge. This knowledge is more hidden and more 
experientially-based knowledge useful to navigate the intricacies of different 
cultures, political regimes and socioeconomic systems (Eriksson, Johanson, 
Majkgard, & Sharma, 1997). Explicit forms of market knowledge that do exist 
might be of questionable quality or might be expired due to political or economic 
changes. The acquisition of the explicit market knowledge can therefore evolve 
into a lengthy and difficult process. However, tacit knowledge tends to be even 
more difficult to acquire (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977).  
 
Even though the acquisition of the various kinds of market knowledge is difficult 
enough, another perspective of importance is the transfer of knowledge within the 
organization. Organizational learning about a new host country is not a smooth 
and seamless process. It appears to be a complex process that varies significantly 
from firm to firm, due to variations in internal flows of local market knowledge 
(Lord & Ranft, 2000).  Moreover, tacit knowledge seems to be acquired through 
personal experiences and therefore difficult to separate from the individuals who 
possess it (Polanyi, 1962).  
 
By this, the HQ can involve in subsidiary decisions and assist the strategy 
development. Without HQ involvement in subsidiary strategy development, the 
transfer of knowledge would be limited. Another key ingredient of the 
organizational structure is the involvement of executive managers. A reward or 
incentive system should be implied to increase managers’ active engagement in 
divisional strategy formulation and implementation (Lord & Ranft, 2000). 
Managers do often have accumulated host country knowledge through past 
experiences. An incentive system will increase the probability that managers share 
their knowledge to other divisions (Lord & Ranft, 2000). Moreover, rotation of 
managers and the transfer to different locations could lead to more internal share 
of knowledge.  
 
In this thesis we will focus on the use of host country managers. Hiring local 
managers is an effective method of acquiring both tacit and explicit local 
knowledge (Mitra & Golder, 2002). The necessary familiarity with the local 
market and business leads to a higher emphasis of hiring local managers. But, on 
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the contrary, use of local managers will limit the management development and 
the organizational development (Harzing, 2001). In other words, managers from 
the home country will not gain the necessarily international experience if local 
managers are used at the sub. Further, the creation or improvement of 
communication channels between the HQ and sub will suffer of less verbal 
communication (Harzing, 2001). We therefore argue that use of local managers or 
home-country managers is a trade-off between acquisitions of local market 
knowledge and the development of the organization as a whole.  
 
These findings illustrate that organizational structure is decisive for the internal 
transfer of knowledge. The relationship between the sub and HQ affects the level 
of knowledge transfer. Appropriate use of executive managers and subsidiary 
managers can facilitate higher level of internal transfer of knowledge. Use of local 
managers in subsidiaries should be perceived as an efficient method of acquiring 
both tacit and explicit local knowledge, while the organizational development 
would be limited without use of home-country managers.  
 
Methodology and Data Collection 
The methodology in this paper will first introduce the research design we have 
found appropriate, which is a case study. This study will en able us to develop a 
thoroughly understanding about the inte rnationalization process of the 
participating SME’s. On the other hand, we are not able to generalize our findings 
due to the fact that we only investigate a limited number of firms in one cluster. 
The research instrument in us e is in -depth interviews with m anagers of 
headquarters in Bergen and subsidiaries  in Houston (see appendix for the two 
semi-structured interview guides). 
 
The main idea of case studies is to look at cases in order to develop theory 
inductively (Eisenhardt and Graebne r, 2007). In term s of the underlying 
philosophy of this method, there exist differences among academics regarding the 
right way to perform c ase studies. For our study, the constructionist research 
design is deemed appropriate, as it assumes that «there is no absolute truth, and 
the job of the researcher should be to es tablish how various claim s for trust and 
reality become constructed in everyday lif e» (Easterby-Smith et al, 2008). Due to 
the fact that we conduct in -depth interviews to collect our data, we have a 
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qualitative method, meaning that the data collected is mainly in the form of words 
(Easterby-Smith et al, 2008). 
 
The main purpose of our interviews is to  get an understanding of the m anagers’ 
and the subsidiaries view on the situation in the ir own companies, the perceptions 
they have about the proce ss of internationalization , and why they believ e this is 
the case. We cannot reveal these rich data by using a  questionnaire. But, we seek 
to cover  certain aspects and topics  throughout the interviews in order to get 
sufficient knowledge about our  research questions. This leads us to using sem i-
structured interviews, with a topic guide for the interviewers in order to make sure 
that all topics are covered. The procedure for our interviews will be elaborated on 
in the next section. The language of the interviews is Norwegian in B ergen and 
English in Houston. Citations (Norwegian) that we will use in the final thesis will 
be translated into English. 
 
The research question 
This research includes a great variation of topics covered by various fields of 
literature. We have chosen to ground our interview guide in the existing literature 
covering numerous themes in the internationalization field. This broad theoretical 
perspective may contribute to produce richer data than a narrower perspective. We 
formulate our research question as follows: 
 
How does high-tech SMEs from the subsea cluster perceive and deal with the 
market entry process, and how do they experience the relationship and the 
knowledge transfer between the HQ and the subsidiary? 
 
This research question will be an overall guideline for our interview guide and 
will influence the direction of all the questions.  
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Schedule and Progress  
Most of the interviews in Bergen are already conducted and transcribed. This 
overview shows both activities already done and what remains.  
Date Activity Comment 
01.04.2011 Draft of Literature Review Draft completed 
01.05.2011 Interview guide HQ finalized Completed  
01.08.2011 8 x HQ interview/Transcription, Bergen Completed 
16.01.2012 Hand in preliminary thesis report   
10.02.2012 3 x HQ interview/Transcription, Bergen  
10.02.2012 Interview guide Subsidiary finalized  
26.02.2012 # x Subsidiary interview/Transcription, Houston  
01.03.2012 Analyzing and Interpreting the data  
01.04.2012 Review of the structure and the data  
01.09.2012 Conclusion and hand-in   
 
We are still not sure how many firms we will interview in Houston. However, it is 
likely that we will conduct interviews with subsidiaries outside our initial 
population. The reason is that we have established a relationship with Innovasjon 
Norge in Houston. The Norwegian team of Innovasjon Norge in Houston is eager 
to expand our population to secure more information and a broader data 
collection.  
 
In March, we are able to see if any data are missing or if more information is 
required. We are prepared to ask the interviewees to provide us with more 
information if necessary. It will be likely to ask the HQs more questions after the 
interviews of the subsidiaries have been conducted. Also, as this paper has a broad 
research approach it is possible that the literature review should be reviewed after 
all the data is collected and analyzed.  
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Appendix 2: Invitation the research project Houston 
 
Research project on Norwegian subsidiaries in Houston 
Company name: 
Hi, 
I refer to our conversation where we agreed that I should send you an e-mail.  
We invite your firm to participate in a research project financed by NCE Subsea, 
NCE Maritime, and the Research C ouncil of Norway. We aim to investigate how 
Norwegian subsidiaries in  Houston cope with m arket entry, com petition, and 
market challenges. 
We plan to conduct interviews (ca. 1 hour duration) in week 7 and 8 (from 13 th to 
24th of February), with firms in Houston. We hope that you r firm will participate 
in the study. 
We will concentrate on the following topics: subsidiary strategy and development, 
communications with headquarters, subsid iary relations with  local firm s in 
Houston, main experiences and learning.  
We will treat all information confidentially, according to research ethics.  
Two research assistants; Kj etil Njærheim and Anas Chair Y emlahi, will conduct 
the research in Houston in close cooperation with the project leader.  
We look forward to hearing from you. 
Yours sincerely 
Project leader 
Inger Beate Pettersen, PhD 
Associate professor 
Project leader 
BI, Norwegian Business School 
+47 98 25 16 05 
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Appendix 3: Interview guide for Norwegian Subsea companies – Headquarter   
Intervjuguide - subsea bedrifter: 
Del 1: Introduksjon og historie 
 Informasjon (5-10 min) 
 Si litt om temaet for samtalen (bakgrunn, formål)  
 Forklar hva intervjuet skal brukes til og forklar taushetsplikt og 
anonymitet  
 Spør om noe er uklart og om respondenten har noen spørsmål  
 Informer om ev. opptak, sørg for samtykke til ev. opptak  
 Start opptak 
Bakgrunnsinformasjon knyttet til den ansatte og generelt om ansatte: 
- Stilling, utdanningsbakgrunn, arbeidserfaring, bransjer, utenlandserfaring. 
 
- Hva er utdanningsnivået til de ansatte i bedriften, og hvor mange ansatte i 
bedriften har utenlandserfaring? 
Bakgrunn knyttet til selskapets internasjonaliserings prosess:  
- Fortell om bakgrunnen til selskapet, når det ble etablert, ideen bak 
etablering, ca. omsetning, antall ansatte, vekst 
- Fortell litt om bakgrunnen til internasjonaliseringen, hvordan fikk dere 
ideen til å gå utenlands, hvilket marked valgte dere først og hvorfor 
akkurat det markedet?  
- Hvilke faktorer påvirket valg av marked? Hvorfor akkurat det spesifikke 
markedet?  
 Hva er/var motivasjonen for internasjonalisering? 
- Kan du beskrive prosessen som førte fram til den første eksporten/eller 
internasjonalisering? Hvordan begynte det? Identifikasjon av marked, 
kunde, markedsmuligheter – eksportør eller kjøperdrevet, proaktiv 
eller reaktiv? Forespørsel fra kunde, eller proaktivt salgsarbeid fra 
dere? Strategisk fundert eller mer utnyttelse av muligheter som dukket 
opp?  
- Hvilken innflytelse hadde nettverk på avgjørelser i forhold til 
internasjonaliseringsprosessen i tidlig fase?   
 
Del 2: Internasjonaliseringsprosess og strategier – bruk av nettverk 
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- Hvordan fikk dere (nødvendig) markedskunnskap (hva er kritisk 
markedskunnskap), fikk dere tilgang til den via egne ansatte/egen 
kompetanse, via nettverk, etc.   
- Hva med valg av inngangsstrategi (indirekte eksport/direkte eksport, 
agenter, salgskontor, kontrakter (lisensiering, franchising) – hva har 
vært avgjørende faktorer for valg (produktfaktorer/service, 
organisatoriske/ressurser, markedsbetingelser, risiko, kundekrav etc.) 
- Hvis markedsetablering – beskriv prosessen med å etablere seg, 
inklusive bruk av interne og/eller eksterne nettverk/ressurser (om 
mulig få de til å eksemplifisere hvordan ulike nettverksaktører blir 
brukt)   
- I hvilken grad har relasjoner til norske kunder en betydning for 
internasjonalisering? Godt rykte via norske kunder, godt rykte 
gjennom subsea klyngen? Erfaring med oppdrag som underleverandør? 
- I hvilken grad har relasjoner til utenlandske kunder en betydning for 
internasjonalisering? Samme som ovenfor.  
- Har dere møtt ulike barrierer for internasjonalisering? (finansielle, 
organisatoriske, person ressurser, kompetanse, ikke tilgang til nettverk, 
markedskunnskap, tid og ressurser, risiko, kulturell distanse, mangel 
på commitment i ledelsen, hos personer)  
- Og hvis barrierer: hvordan har dere håndtert disse barrierene (spesielt 
få fram om nettverk har spilt noen rolle mht å overkomme barrierer – 
og på hvilken måte og type nettverk)  
- Hvorfor (eller hvorfor ikke) har dere ”lykkes” med internasjonalisering 
 
Del 3 Lokale og globale nettverk – informasjonsflyt og læring, dilemma  
 Hvilke nettverk har hatt størst betydning for bedriftens utvikling, for 
kunnskap, kompetanse, markedskunnskap og lignende, hvilke er viktig 
fremover, og har dette endret seg over tid, etter hvert som dere har blitt 
mer internasjonale?  
 Hvor bevisste har dere vært mht å utvikle relasjoner til andre aktører i 
klyngen, hvorfor har dere sett på dette som viktig/ikke viktig  
 Hvilken innflytelse har nettverket på deres avgjørelser i 
internasjonaliseringsprosessen nå i forhold til da dere nylig hadde startet å 
utvide utenlands?  
 Utfordringer med å overføre (eksportere/importere) kunnskap mellom 
hovedkvarteret i Norge og kontorene i utlandet? 
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Appendix 4: Interview guide for Norwegian Subsea companies – Subsidiaries 
in Houston 
Interview guide (subsidiary perspective) – Houston study 
Topics 
A. Background information 
1. President/general manager 
- Education, previous job experience, networks  
- Selection/recruitment process  
2. Subsidiary organization  
- Employees and functions (building the organization, recruitment and start-up 
process)  
3. Headquarter (HQ) and subsidiary relations and practices 
- Decision-making strategy and practices in the multinational company?  
- Degree of control – autonomy – to what degree? (strategic/tactical) 
 
B. The multinational company’s headquarter (HQ) and subsidiary relations – 
knowledge transfer and knowledge application 
4. Types of knowledge transfer from HQ to the subsidiary?  
5. Types of knowledge transfer from subsidiary to HQ? 
6. How has knowledge been transferred to the subsidiary and vice versa? 
 What kind of mechanisms are being used, and what kind of structures 
enhances the transfer 
7. How has the subsidiary applied and eventually adapted parent firm knowledge 
in Houston?  
8.  How will you describe relations between HQ and the subsidiary?  
- (We assume that having an expatriate or a local/national as general manager will 
influence perceptions/experiences) 
 
C. Linkages with local businesses/ organizations in Houston 
9.  How is the subsidiary’s relations with local firms, institutions in Houston (e.g. 
suppliers, R&D…) 
10. How are these relationships contributing to the subsidiary and the firm as a 
whole? 
11. Does the subsidiary have contact (irregular or regular) with other ‘Norwegian’ 
firms in Houston? Who? Where? How? Benefits? 
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D. Challenges for small- and medium sized firms in Houston – retrospective 
thoughts 
12. What are the main challenges being a small- and medium sized multinational 
firm in Houston? 
13. Have you experienced cultural differences between Norway and USA?  
14. If you think retrospectively about this subsidiary‘s evolvement – what has 
been important/challenging in the various phases 
15. How would you evaluate the subsidiary’s performance today compared to 
expectations originally made by HQ before the subsidiary’s establishment? 
16. Based on your experience in establishing/running this subsidiary – in 
retrospect - would you have done things differently?  
17. What have been the main lessons learnt and knowledge attained from being 
the general manager of this subsidiary? 
17b. Has the background of NCE Subsea Bergen, other companies in Bergen, or 
the cluster as a whole been a useful tool to posses in Houston? (If the company 
derives from this cluster)  
 
E. Business Development/Growth 
18. Is there a need for new/improved mechanisms to strengthen future HQ-
Subsidiary relations? If so, what steps do you have in mind? 
19. Have you used any external consultants in the process of establishing the US 
subsidiary (Innovation Norway, INTSOK or other local consultants)? If no, are 
you considering this option? If yes, how is the experience?  
20. Have you contemplated changing the structure of the subsidiary company, in 
the form of a joint venture or partnerships with other US companies? 
21. Would the company benefit from working in a cluster with other Norwegian 
companies? (co-location) 
22. What are the companys policy in local employees vs expats? 
23. What are the future plans for growth/expansions 
24. How important is the US market compared to rest of the world? 
25. Was establishment in Houston strategic (closer to decision maker) or tactical 
(sales to Gulf of Mexico region) motivated? 
26. Any other concerns you might have, not listed in this interview?  
 
GRA 19003 – Master Thesis     01.09.2012  
Page 109 
Appendix 5: Interview guide for key informants and facilitators 
Interview guide – Key Informants - Facilitators  
(IN, Intsok, Chamber of Commerce, Konsulatet)  
 
Information  
 The background for the research 
 Explain the objectives of the research 
 We will treat all information confidentially  
1. Information about the key informant and the organization 
- Numbers of employees, different  roles and functions  and the background 
of the employees? (education, experience) 
 
- What kind of services do IN (others) provide to Norwegian companies 
coming to Houston? 
- Are Norwegian firms aware of the services that you provide? 
 
Do Norwegian companies demand these types of services? 
- What are Norwegian companies’ primary motives? (market opportunities, 
establish production facilities, establish a subsidiary, searching for partners 
(financial investors, business, R&D?, others) 
- What kind of services do they need – to accomplish their goals? 
 
- What are the most important benefits for the companies using your 
services?  
 
 
2. Norwegian subsidiaries 
(Since we are first and foremost interested in Norwegian firms that have 
established own subsidiaries, we have specific questions regarding their 
needs, behavior and strategies when entering Houston)  
- In the phase before market entry, what are the general concerns of 
Norwegian companies? 
 
- How does the average SME prepare itself (strategy process, collecting 
market information, other) before the establishment? 
 
o Do the companies have a well-defined and developed plan of 
strategies and objectives before the entry- decision?  
o What motives are most important for Norwegian companies in the 
decision process pre- entry?   
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- Do the companies lack critical resources in the market entry process? If 
yes, which?  
 
Do the companies experience any cultural, political or other barriers when 
entering Houston? If yes, which, why and how? 
-  
- What are the main challenges of an SME operating in Houston - in the 
subsidiary development phase and later in the growth phase – different 
challenges?  
 
- How do the companies cope with these challenges?  
 
- The companies can choose among different operating modes such as using 
agents, JV, WH, acquisition etc. Are there specific factors in the US (and 
Houston, Oil industry) that affect the choice of entry mode?  
 
- How important are the US market for the Norwegian firms, compared to 
the rest of the world? 
 
 
3. Relationship between HQ and subsidiary 
o What is your impression of the relationship between Norwegian 
headquarters and subsidiaries in Houston? 
o What are the most important types of knowledge transfer between 
the subsidiary and the head quarter? 
o  Use of expats or locals varies among companies. What is your 
opinion concerning   these alternatives? What benefits and/or 
disadvantages exist with expats versus locals and eventually a 
combination?  
o Does HQ take advantage of the experience and market knowledge 
locals possess? 
o Is there a need for improved mechanisms to strengthen future HQ-
Subsidiary relations? If so, what steps do you have in mind 
(control, information flow, cooperation?) 
o How would you evaluate Norwegian subsidiaries performance in 
Houston?   
 
 
 
4. Norwegian subsidiaries and contact with local firms in Houston 
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o Do Norwegian subsidiaries establish relations with local firms and 
other institutions in Houston? With who and to what extent? 
(Suppliers, facilitators, R&D etc.?) 
o Is there frequent contact between Norwegian firms/subsidiaries in 
Houston? -Positive synergies, helping each other, information 
flow, business cooperation, other benefits? 
o  
5. Summary – closing questions 
o How do US firms perceive the Norwegian oil cluster, and 
Norwegian firms and subsidiaries? (Image: trustworthy, competent, 
arrogant, flexible, competitive, other adjectives? Any benefits 
coming from Norway? 
o What kind of recommendations would you give to companies that 
consider entering the US market today? Examples of ‘best 
practices’ 
o What are the typical pitfalls Norwegian SMEs experiences? 
o Any other issues not covered by our questions?  
 
